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In 1998, the balance tipped: for the first time, Latinos and Lati-
nas1 comprised a greater percentage of the national school-age popu-
lation than did African Americans.2 Within forty years, Whites will
become a statistical minority in the United States’ school-age popula-
tion3—and in an increasing number of public school districts.4 In Ha-
waii, New Mexico, and California, this population shift has occurred
Copyright © 2001 Kristi L. Bowman.
1. A note on terminology: first, I view racial and ethnic categorizations as proper nouns
and will capitalize them as such; second, I choose to use “Latino” rather than “Hispanic” to em-
phasize the contemporary place of origin rather than the conquerors of several centuries gone
by; third, although I would prefer to use “Latino/a” rather than the supposedly neutral but also
masculine “Latino” when discussing both males and females, I have chosen to use “Latino” to
minimize distraction from the substance of my argument. For further discussion of issues of no-
menclature, see, e.g., U.S. District Judge Seals’s opinion in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independ-
ent School District, 324 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (describing the “naming for identi-
fication” phenomenon) and Ian F. Haney López, Retaining Race: LatCrit Theory and Mexican
American Identity in Hernandez v. Texas, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 279, 279 n.1 (1997) (capi-
talizing racial designations and employing the term “Latino/a”).
2. Mary Ann Zehr, Un Dia Nuevo for Schools, EDUC. WK., Nov. 8, 2000, at 39. The
United States Census Bureau estimates that Latinos will be the United States’ largest Non-
White racial and ethnic group by 2005. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections Program,
Population Division, Projections of the Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Na-
tivity: Middle Series, 2001 to 2005, at http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/
summary/np-t5-b.txt (Jan. 13, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
3. Minority Groups to Emerge As a Majority in U.S. Schools, EDUC. WK., Sept. 27, 2000,
at 34 [hereinafter Minority Groups]. Whites will be a minority in the United States population
by 2060. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections Program, Population Division, Projections
of the Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Nativity: Middle Series, 2050 to 2070, at
http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary/np-t5-g.txt (Jan. 13, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
4. See Minority Groups, supra note 3, at 34 (“[D]emographers project that all but two
states—Arkansas and Mississippi—will see an increase in their minority [student] enrollments
between now and 2015.”).
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already.5 Texas will have a Non-White majority around 2015, and
Arizona, New York, Nevada, New Jersey, and Maryland will quickly
follow.6 The rapidly changing racial and ethnic demographics of our
country might seem surprising not only because a Non-White major-
ity is anticipated within the next sixty years, but also because so much
of the growth will occur in the Latino population. The 2000 United
States Census shows that the percentage of respondents identifying
themselves as Latino increased 60% since 1990 and that Latinos will
be the United States’ largest minority group even sooner than ex-
pected.7
American society operates in a paradigm in which an individual
is a member of the “majority” or the “minority,” either White or
Non-White. As a group, Latinos are nearly invisible within this para-
digm because Non-White often is presumed to be roughly equivalent
to African American. This invisibility is readily apparent in contem-
porary school desegregation law: it is not only law students and law-
yers who know that Brown v. Board of Education8 was about African
American schoolchildren in Topeka, Kansas. The perception of
Brown and its progeny as occurring in a society where there are two
races, Black and White, is widely shared. This Black–White binary
has influenced courts’ and legislatures’ race-conscious remedies such
as school desegregation orders and employment discrimination
claims. When those remedies originated in the 1960s, they reflected a
population that was nearly 90% White, including an estimated 4%
Latino, and 10% African American.9
Although plaintiffs brought successful challenges to Latino seg-
regation in public schools before Brown cemented the idea that
“separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,”10 the Court
5. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, MAGICAL URBANISM: LATINOS REINVENT THE U.S. CITY 1
(2000) (noting California’s demographic shift); Ian F. Haney López, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure:
The Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57, 123 (1998) (discussing Hawaii and
New Mexico’s demographic shift).
6. López, supra note 5, at 123.
7. D’Vera Cohn & Darryl Fears, Hispanics Draw Even with Blacks in New Census,
WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2001, at A1. Because race and ethnicity are separate questions on the cen-
sus, some individuals who self-identify as racially African American could also self-identify as
Latino. However, only 1.7% of African American respondents also indicated that they are a
member of another racial group, thus making it less likely that a significant number of individu-
als designated themselves both racially African American and ethnically Latino. Id.
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It’s Not Just Black and White
Anymore, 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958-59 (1995) (citing the 1960 United States Census).
10. 347 U.S. at 495.
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made no mention of those cases, or any reference to Latinos, in its
1954 decision. Brown ushered in an era of viewing school desegrega-
tion in a Black–White binary. It was not until almost two decades
later, in 1973, that the framework changed.
In Keyes v. Denver,11 the Court endorsed the White–Non-White
paradigm by deciding that it would classify Latinos with African
Americans for purposes of school desegregation. Since 1973, the
changing racial composition of the United States and of public
schools has resulted in many courts’ balancing schools12 according to a
White–Non-White paradigm that ignores the full spectrum of racial
and ethnic difference and presumes that Non-White groups are fun-
gible for purposes of racial and ethnic balance.13 The White–Non-
White paradigm is injurious to Brown’s intent, because instead of
promoting equality, it promotes the dominance of whiteness. “White”
becomes the singular point of reference for all other races; if one is
not White, the “other” race to which one belongs is immaterial.
White dominance and privilege remain unquestioned when “White”
is the standard against which all else is defined. This White norm has
been particularly harmful to Latinos, whose history has been margi-
nalized even more than that of African Americans.14 This approach to
balancing schools is not only intellectually imprecise, but also it de-
nies Latinos the full benefits of school desegregation.
Some Latino and Asian American scholars have discussed their
strong feelings of identification with the African American civil rights
struggle.15 Similarly, Asian Americans have joined as plaintiffs in a
11. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
12. In the remedy phase of school desegregation litigation, courts commonly require that
schools throughout the district contain numbers of White and Non-White students roughly pro-
portional to the respective percentage of White and Non-White students in the district. This
practice is generally known as balancing schools along the lines of the race and ethnicity of stu-
dents.
13. For recent examples, see infra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
14. See Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop with
LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247, 1251-53 (1999) (discussing the domi-
nance of the African American historical and contemporary narrative even within the Critical
Race Theory movement in the early 1990s, and the corresponding emergence of LatCrit the-
ory); infra notes 288-297 and accompanying text (surveying treatment of Latinos in legal educa-
tion).
15. See, e.g., ENRIQUE (HENRY) T. TRUEBA, LATINOS UNIDOS: FROM CULTURAL
DIVERSITY TO THE POLITICS OF SOLIDARITY 18 (2000) (arguing that “[t]he training ground for
political organization in Latino communities was the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and
1970s”); Mari Matsuda, Beyond and Not Beyond Black and White: Deconstruction Has a Poli-
tics, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS (Jerome McCristal
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number of equal protection cases brought by African Americans,
such as Loving v. Virginia.16 These Non-White groups have benefited
from the rhetoric of the African American civil rights struggle and
from the legal achievements of that movement.17 In the context most
relevant to this Note, school desegregation litigation, Latinos and Af-
rican Americans both must be integrated with White students. This
Note discusses the importance of Latinos in school desegregation ef-
forts past and present caused by the already substantial and rapidly
growing Latino population in the United States. Latinos are an im-
portant constituency nationwide and, specifically, in many school dis-
tricts with outstanding desegregation decrees. However, many of the
ideas discussed here are not exclusive to Latinos. The concepts have
parallels to other racial and ethnic groups. For example, in parts of
California and New York where large concentrations of Asian
Americans reside, Asian Americans’ experiences are similar to, but
certainly should not be assumed to be identical to, Latinos’ experi-
ences more generally.18
Part I of this Note analyzes how the Latino identity has been so-
cially constructed inside ever-changing concepts of race and ethnicity
as well as inside the Black–White binary. This construction has been
strongly influenced by various branches of the federal government,
which have attempted to define the Latino identity in inconsistent, of-
ten conflicting ways. Part II reviews the widely neglected history of
Latino school segregation and resistance to that segregation through
litigation, focusing on Mendez v. Westminster,19 a precursor to Brown.
Part III analyzes the contemporary framework for school desegrega-
tion: the White–Non-White paradigm that conflates Latino and Afri-
can American identities. Under the guise of providing equal educa-
tional opportunity, this new paradigm simultaneously disadvantages
both groups and perpetuates the White norm. Finally, Part IV pro-
Culp, Jr. et al. eds., forthcoming 2001) (noting common ties between the Asian American and
African American civil rights movements).
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Professor Matsuda recounts this bond: “We were children in Los Angeles when Black
nationalist graffiti first started appearing on the walls and we heard phrases like ‘Black is beauti-
ful.’ For Asian Americans, this remarkable inversion meant yellow was also possibly beautiful.”
Matsuda, supra note 15.
18. See generally ROBERT CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, LAW, AND THE
NATION-STATE 11-26 (1999) (discussing the construction of the Asian American identity within
the Black–White binary).
19. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
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poses a range of measures that can be taken to alleviate the margi-
nalization of Latinos in the context of school desegregation.
I.  CONSTRUCTION OF THE LATINO IDENTITY
To understand the ways society acts upon a group of individuals
to create their identity as Latinos, it is first necessary to examine the
means through which race and ethnicity are constructed. The Black–
White binary pervades the contemporary American discourse about
race. The Latino identity has been created in this binary—a binary in
which it has no easy fit. The ever-changing classification of Latinos in
the United States’ decennial census illustrates the difficulty of this fit.
It is important to understand the inconsistent nature of the Latino
identity before turning directly to a discussion of school desegrega-
tion. This inconsistent nature has specifically informed past attempts
by Latinos to challenge school segregation, and it continues to influ-
ence the present treatment of Latinos in the context of school deseg-
regation litigation.
A. Construction of Race, Ethnicity, and the Black–White Binary
The concept of race in the English language can be traced back
to the sixteenth century, where it originally served as a demarcation
of common ancestors.20 Not until the late eighteenth century did race
come to be understood as indicating immutable, biological differ-
ences.21 Today, the concept of race remains powerful because of the
claim that race has biological bases.22 However, the fluidity of assign-
ment to a particular racial group can be seen across continents and
centuries. In the early American colonial period, an individual’s race,
as perceived by others, was strongly influenced by his or her wealth.23
The same is true in contemporary Brazilian society.24 When racial
classification is demanded yet race is increasingly unclear,25 the results
20. 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 69 (2d ed. 1989).
21. Id.; see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 28 (1991) (discussing the historical treatment of race as a fixed trait).
22. Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
1659, 1661 (1995).
23. See Gotanda, supra note 21, at 32 (“[S]laveholders developed a complementary ideo-
logical structure of racial categories that served to legitimate slavery.”).
24. See id. at 31 (describing the fluidity of racial labels in Brazilian society).
25. See RICHARD J. PAYNE, GETTING BEYOND RACE: THE CHANGING AMERICAN
CULTURE 138 (1998) (“Racially categorizing people from throughout the world is fast becoming
almost impossible.”).
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can be troublesome: “Public schools struggle with trying to fit multi-
racial children into official racial categories. Some administrators, like
census personnel, arbitrarily classify children.”26
Race is now understood by many to be socially constructed
rather than biologically based.27 The social construction of race means
that one’s skin color and other physical characteristics, which may
serve as general indicators of someone’s “race,” do not have inherent
meaning. For example, Whites are not inherently “smarter” than Af-
rican Americans.28 However, in the words of Professor Ian Haney
López, this lack of inherent biological meaning “does not diminish in
any way [race’s] social power or permanence.”29 Race gains meaning
through social practices that assign value based upon skin color and
other physiological characteristics.30 For purposes of this Note, I in-
terpret race as a combination of the shared social treatment experi-
enced by a group defined largely by their physical characteristics, and
the tangible results of those assumptions, such as a group’s general
socioeconomic position.
The foundation for Americans’ understanding of race is rooted
in both the United States’ history of slavery and the Jim Crow laws
and segregation that followed radical Reconstruction.31 Professor
Richard Payne describes this contemporary conception of race as his-
torically “based on the unusually sharp and rigidly fixed division be-
tween black and white, which is designed to keep the two groups
26. Id.
27. Professor López notes that “[t]he notion that race is biological is now widely recog-
nized as a patent falsehood, an injurious myth deserving emphatic repudiation.” López, supra
note 5, at 99. Professor Juan Perea elaborates on this statement, noting that “[t]he idea that
knowledge is socially constructed, and therefore both contingent upon the values of a society
and highly formative of those values in subsequent generations, is now well established as a
premise of critical theory.” Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The
“Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1219 n.27 (1997).
28. For refutation of the assumptions about race and intelligence in RICHARD J.
HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE
IN AMERICA (1994), see generally THE BELL CURVE DEBATE: HISTORY, DOCUMENTS,
OPINIONS (Russell Jacoby & Naomi Glauberman eds., 1995) (collecting more than seventy
scholars’ criticisms of The Bell Curve). See also Jeffrey Rosen & Charles Lane, The Sources of
The Bell Curve, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 529, 529-30
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES] (cri-
tiquing the sources and data upon which The Bell Curve relied).
29. López, supra note 5, at 99.
30. Id. at 100 (“Though a social construction, race is real. Its reality lies in social practices,
including beliefs in natural group divisions and their significance, not in the abstract ‘truth’ of
such beliefs.”).
31. See PAYNE, supra note 25, at 136.
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separate and unequal.”32 Similarly, Professor Richard Delgado devel-
ops an illustrative fictional dialogue in which one character claims:
“the classic, the essential racial group is black. . . . When someone
mentions ‘civil rights,’ you immediately think black.”33 The Black–
White binary as a way of conceptualizing race dominates not only
legal scholarship,34 but scholarly books about White racism,35 law
school texts,36 and—perhaps most importantly—such vehicles of
popular culture as media and film.37 This binary gives due attention to
the experiences of African Americans, but it results in the
marginalization, and even invisibility, of other groups, including
Asian Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos.38
While the concept of race is centuries old, the American idea of
ethnicity dates back only to the early 1940s.39 While race has been
commonly connected with physical characteristics, ethnicity has been
limited to cultural factors such as language, religion, and tradition.40
The characteristics that constitute an ethnicity can be defined either
by the members of a group or by outsiders.41 Like race, ethnicity is
mutable, as evidenced by its different construction in countries
around the world. In some countries, race is “a dimension of ethnic-
ity, while for others ethnicity [is] a dimension of race.”42 As Literature
and Afro-American Studies Professor Werner Sollors notes, contem-
porary scholars have been unable to consider race and ethnicity two
separate categories, because the distinction is not as simple as the
32. Id.
33. RICHARD DELGADO, WHEN EQUALITY ENDS: STORIES ABOUT RACE AND
RESISTANCE 118 (1999).
34. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Bi-
nary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571, 573 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has “encouraged an underinclusive, binary discourse about race”); Perea, supra note 27, at 1221-
32 (discussing the critique of this binary according to Critical Race Theory).
35. Perea, supra note 27, at 1232-39 (analyzing literature on how White racism affects
Blacks in particular).
36. See infra notes 288-96 and accompanying text.
37. See Perea, supra note 34, at 573 (describing the Black–White binary as depicted in
popular media).
38. Perea, supra note 27, at 1220.
39. Werner Sollors, Foreword: Theories of American Ethnicity, in THEORIES OF
ETHNICITY: A CLASSICAL READER, at x, x (Werner Sollors ed., 1996); see also 5 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 424 (illustrating the changing use of “ethnicity” in the
English language through examples).
40. López, supra note 5, at 289.
41. Perea, supra note 34, at 575.
42. CLARA E. RODRÍGUEZ, CHANGING RACE: LATINOS, THE CENSUS, AND THE HISTORY
OF ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (2000).
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suggestion that race is nature and ethnicity is culture.43 The bounda-
ries between the two imperfect designations were never clear and, at
the beginning of a new century, are becoming increasingly blurred.44
Recognizing the social construction of race and ethnicity renders
the two concepts suspiciously similar as demarcations of group iden-
tity and accounts for the definitional overlap. What is gained from
discussing race and ethnicity as separate constructs is a recognition
that they have been “deployed in fundamentally different ways.”45
Thus, while two ethnic groups can be White, and thus share the pre-
sumption of innate similarity, racial difference has led to the conclu-
sion that the racially Non-White group is innately inferior.46
Professor Juan Perea suggests two ways in which the connection
between race and ethnicity has been misunderstood.47 First, ethnicity
has been viewed as merely part of race, as in the case of a Latino ju-
ror who was struck because he was bilingual—a cultural and ethnic
characteristic, but one the court viewed as a racial trait.48 Indeed, a
not-insignificant number of people with Latino heritage cannot speak
Spanish. Second, ethnicity is assumed to be irrelevant because race is
the primary measure of classification. This assumption disregards the
reality that people of different races can be part of the same ethnic
group, both within and outside a particular country.49 Two Latinas
who share the same Mexican American mother but have different fa-
thers, one White, one African American, each could be considered
Latina, even though their racial heritage is different. Additionally, the
concepts of race and ethnicity should not be confused with national
identity. Racially, White South Africans can have radically different
physical characteristics than Black South Africans. The effects of
those physical differences are clear from the different treatment re-
43. Sollors, supra note 39, at xxxiv.
44. Roger Clegg, Census Sense and Nonsense, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, at http://www.
nationalreview.com/contributors/cleggprint030701.html (Mar. 7, 2001) (“Race is a dubious con-
struct, especially in America, where there is so much intermarriage and so many of us have
mixed ethnicities.”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). This National Review article leads to a
different conclusion regarding the consideration of race and ethnicity than I advance, but our
agreement about the impracticability of the categories is significant.
45. López, supra note 5, at 283.
46. See id. at 291 (discussing treatment of those groups seen as “innately inferior” to
Whites).
47. Perea, supra note 34, at 596-603.
48. Id. at 596-97.
49. Id. at 600.
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ceived by the two groups under apartheid.50 Ethnically, first-
generation Americans with Korean heritage can have significantly
different experiences in the United States because of their cultural
identity than first-generation Americans with Swedish heritage.51
Scholars refer to Latinos as both a racial and an ethnic group,52
but trying to classify Latinos in only one category (race or ethnicity)
illustrates the problematic nature of the categories themselves. If La-
tinos are viewed as a separate race in order to be “on par” with Afri-
can Americans, then their ethnic identity will have been collapsed
into their racial identity. Given the history of slavery and the contin-
ued “demarcation line of skin color” that have created the Black–
White racial binary,53 there is little room within the racial framework
for a distinct Latino racial category. Alternatively, if Latinos are
viewed only as an ethnic group, then to fit within the larger Black–
White binary they must also be assigned to one of the two racial
groups. As will be discussed later, the Census Bureau has taken this
approach, classifying Latinos as racially White in every decennial
50. For a captivating (and true) description of the struggles of Black South African lawyers
and their relations with their White counterparts, see generally KENNETH S. BROUN, BLACK
LAWYERS, WHITE COURTS: THE SOUL OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW (2000).
51. Cultural beliefs may differ along the lines of gender roles and priorities such as work
and family. For example, Asian societies and Asian Americans may harbor more “traditional”
notions of power relations between men and women. See, e.g., AMY TAN, THE JOY LUCK CLUB
(1990) (depicting the experiences of some Chinese American women). Scandinavians are known
for being among the most progressive people worldwide in terms of women’s equality, and this
general social progressivism pervades areas of the United States that have a high concentration
of Scandinavians, such as Minnesota, and is evident in Minnesota’s support of presidential can-
didates. Minnesota’s electoral votes have gone to the Democratic candidate for the past seven
presidential elections, including President Reagan’s landslide victory in 1984. Calling All Swing
States: Endgame, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 2000, at 110; Presidential Results Summary for All States,
at http://cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/results/president/index3.html. (last visited Apr. 19, 2001)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
52. Eduardo Mendieta, The Making of New Peoples: Hispanizing Race, in
HISPANICS/LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: ETHNICITY, RACE, AND RIGHTS 45, 49 (Jorge
J.E. Gracia & Pablo de Greiff eds., 2000) (“Hispanics are not a race, they are an ethnicity. One
can argue that they do not even constitute an ethnicity, for an ethnicity consists of a set of social
practices that can be discerned and distinctly drawn out.”). Professor López agrees that Latinos
have been raced, see infra note 81 and accompanying text, but in his theory this does not require
viewing Latinos as a race. See López, supra note 5, at 97 (“Latino groups have not been as con-
sistently racialized as others, for example Whites or African Americans. The Hispanic category,
for example, is of particularly recent vintage.”).
53. Raul Yzaguirre & Charles Kamasaki, Comment on “The Latino Civil Rights Crisis: A
Research Conference,” Harvard University Civil Rights Project, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
groups/civilrights/papers/comment/comment.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
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census except the 1930 Census.54 The only way for Latinos to receive
the full benefits of school desegregation is for the discourse to shift
away from the restrictive Black–White55 and race-ethnicity binaries.
As Professor Jerome Culp suggests, the most important category of
social construction may not be the demarcation of race, ethnicity, or
nationality, but that of “other.”56 The role of “other” connotes pow-
erlessness, and it is not necessary to distinguish among race, ethnicity,
and nationality if one is in a marginalized group. The classification of
Non-White embodies otherness.
B. Construction of the Latino Identity: Social Experiences and the
Census
While abstract conceptions of race have existed for centuries, the
origin of a common Latino identity is uncertain. As employed in con-
temporary American society, the Latino group label generally applies
to those with Central American, South American, or Caribbean heri-
tage. Though the use of the term “Latino” has been criticized as
overly broad57 and arguably repeats the same sort of essentialization I
seek to avoid through deconstructing the White–Non-White para-
54. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (detailing, in part, the limited racial cate-
gories used in the census).
55. Perea, supra note 27, at 1215.
56. Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Latinos, Blacks, Others, and the New Legal Narrative, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 479, 479 (1997).
57. It is unlikely that people with Spanish (European) heritage would be assumed to be-
long to this amorphous group. Eduardo Mendieta provides a powerful critique of this generali-
zation implicit in the word “Hispanic.” His comments are equally applicable to the generaliza-
tion inherent in the term “Latino”:
Hispanics are said to be all persons of Latin American descent, who have been in the
United States for several generations, or who might have arrived yesterday. They are
said to speak Spanish, although many do not. Some are immigrants, while others are
political refugees. Some could come from Latin American countries, although it is not
clear whether Spaniards and Brazilians could be considered Hispanic. It is also not
clear whether Blacks, descendants of slaves from the Caribbean and many Latin
American countries with sizable black populations, are either Hispanics or Blacks. In
short, the peoples that the label Hispanic hopes to embrace are too heterogeneous
and diverse to be done justice by this rather homogenizing label. Furthermore, as
Mary Romero has pointed out, the term Hispanic has contributed to the depoliticiza-
tion of the history of each group subsumed under the label and it has deleteriously
and even disrespectfully placed too much weight on the European elements of the
traditions that inform the cultures of the peoples of Latin American descent.
Eduardo Mendieta, Becoming Citizens, Becoming Hispanics, in THE GOOD CITIZEN 123 (David
Balstone & Eduardo Mendieta eds., 1999).
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digm,58 my approach is to be, in Professor Stephanie Wildman’s term,
“strategically essentialist”59 with the goal of illuminating socially con-
structed inequality.
Latinos in the United States share many commonalties, illus-
trated by the shared social treatment of those labeled—and thus
viewed—as Latinos,60 and by their economic position.61 The mutable,
non-fixed nature of group identity is illustrated by the perception that
Latinos who were not born in the United States must learn to per-
form the American Latino identity.62 Despite variations in the “educa-
tion levels, income, and political power” that may distinguish Chica-
nos, Puertoriqquenos, Cuban Americans, and those with Central or
South American heritage, Latino students uniformly “face increasing
levels of school segregation in all parts of the country.”63
Additionally, Latinos are economically worse-off than the gen-
eral population. In married-couple families with at least one person
employed, Latinos have “the highest poverty rates and the lowest in-
come levels, compared with both white and black families.”64 Their
average income is $10,000 lower than the national average.65 In 1996,
Latinos’ income level was slightly below that of African Americans
58. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o Critical Theory, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 307, 310 (1997) (noting the danger of using a single name to refer to a
diverse group).
59. See id. at 311 (“Naming Latinas/os, being strategically essentialist, instead of relying on
the umbrella categories ‘race’ or ‘people of color’ can help us reveal the hierarchies that exist
within the category race.”).
60. See López, supra note 5, at 77 (remarking that the Hernandez opinion treats the exis-
tence of a distinct race as a local question to be answered by community attitudes).
61. Despite potentially different standards of living enjoyed by various subgroups of Lati-
nos (e.g., Cuban Americans being more affluent than Mexican Americans), it is still helpful to
generalize about Latinos’ economic status. Even if some groups are more well off than others,
Latinos as a whole are the most underprivileged group. Importantly, the extreme poverty of
some Latino subgroups is not even offset by other, more affluent Latino sub-groups. For the
U.S. Census Bureau’s breakdown of income by Latino ethnic group in 1997, see U.S. Census
Bureau, Table 2.1: March 1997 CPS: Earnings of Persons by Race-Ethnicity Age 15 and over, at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hispanic/cps97/tab02-01.txt (Aug. 7, 1998) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
62. Professor Mendieta explains this need to perform: “One arrives a Guatemalan, Salva-
dorean, Colombian, Cuban, Venezuelan, Peruvian, Costa Rican, or Dominican, and slowly, af-
ter painful experiences of oppression, marginalization, and isolation, starts to learn to become a
Latino and Hispanic.” Mendieta, supra note 52, at 47.
63. Amy Stuart Wells, Hispanic Education in America: Separate and Unequal, ERIC/CUE
Digest No. 59, at http://www.ed.gov/databases/ERIC_Digests/ed316616.html (1989) (citing Gary
Orfield, The Growth and Concentration of Hispanic Enrollment and the Future of American
Education, presented at National Council of La Raza Conference, Albuquerque, New Mexico,
July 1988) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
64. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 23.
65. Mendieta, supra note 57, at 127.
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and two-thirds that of Whites.66 Latinos’ economic instability is illus-
trated by their having the lowest rates of home ownership and the
highest percentage of income spent on housing,67 as well as their being
less likely than Whites or African Americans to have health insurance
or pensions.68 In 1998, Latinos’ unemployment rate was 2.1% above
Whites’, but 1.9% below African Americans’, implying that although
Latinos have higher employment rates, they hold lower-paying jobs
than African Americans.69 Given this economic position, it is not diffi-
cult to understand why Latinos are characterized as the new “verita-
ble underclass” in American society, successors to a position held by
African Americans for the past two hundred years.70
Latinos have been present in the United States in sizeable num-
bers since the mid-1800s, when Mexico ceded the lands composing
California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah to the United
States at the conclusion of the Mexican–American War, in addition to
recognizing the secession of Texas.71 Significant increases in the num-
ber of Latinos also occurred at the close of the nineteenth century
when Puerto Rico was acquired,72 in the mid-twentieth century when
Mexican migration escalated,73 and in 1959 and the early 1960s fol-
66. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 23.
67. Id.; Mendieta, supra note 52, at 45.
68. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 23-24.
69. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation Summary, at http://www.bls.
gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm (Jan. 2001) (reporting statistics describing the employment
situation in the United States during December 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Ad-
ditionally, the President’s Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for Hispanic
Americans notes a disparity in employment rates between Latinos (men) and Latinas (women):
“Hispanic American males (16 years and older) have a participation rate of 90.2 percent in the
U.S. labor force. The Hispanic women’s labor force participation rate of 58 percent is expected
to increase to 80 percent by the year 2005.” White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for
Hispanic Ams., Who are Hispanic Americans?, in Our Nation on the Fault Line: Hispanic
American Education, at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/FaultLine/who.html (Sept. 1996) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
70. Mendieta, supra note 57, at 128.
71. See MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FEINBERG, WHO COUNTS? THE POLITICS
OF CENSUS-TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 182 (1999) (noting that roughly 80,000 His-
panics resided in New Mexico and California when the United States annexed these lands);
MARK CRAWFORD, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MEXICAN–AMERICAN WAR 16 (1999) (describing
the annexation of Arizona); id. at 61 (describing the annexation of California); id. at 200 (de-
scribing the annexation of Nevada); id. at 201 (describing the annexation of New Mexico); id. at
282 (describing the annexation of Utah).
72. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Building Bridges—Latinas and Latinos at the
Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric, and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 369, 383 n.48
(1994).
73. See id. at 388 (“Between 1900 and 1940 . . . the numbers of Mexicans journeying to the
United States began to increase.”).
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lowing Fidel Castro’s rise to power.74 Since then, Mexican and Cuban
migrations have continued at significant rates.75 In 1999, 20% of the
approximately one million legal immigrants to the United States were
from Mexico; many others were from other parts of Central and
South America.76
Historically, Latinos’ classification as White rather than as Afri-
can American justified the admission of Mexicans as United States
citizens after the Mexican–American War. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ended the Mexican–American War in 1848 and stipulated
that former Mexican citizens were to be given “all the rights of citi-
zens of the United States.”77 Despite the straightforward language of
the treaty, Latinos in these areas struggled for American citizenship.78
When California gained statehood in 1850, its constitution allowed
Latinos to become citizens by virtue of their whiteness.79 California
courts followed their state constitution’s lead, granting some Latinos
the benefits of American citizenship—and then only because of their
status as White males.80 Courts that assigned Latinos a White racial
identity (or raced81 Latinos White) for purposes of determining citi-
74. White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for Hispanic Ams., supra note 69.
75. See Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 72, at 390-92 (noting the continuing influx of Mexi-
can immigrants and the three waves of Cuban immigrants since the late 1950s).
76. Mixed Needs of Immigrants Pose Challenges for Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 27, 2000,
at 38.
77. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb.
2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., art. IX, 9 Stat. 922 (commonly known as the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).
The treaty provided not only for a significant transfer of land from Mexico to the United States
in the area now known as the American southwest, but also served as a measure of protection
for the persons living on that land. It is printed in the Statutes at Large in both English and
Spanish. Id.
78. See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA 260 (2000) (claiming that the President and Senate, despite the treaty lan-
guage, were “unwilling[] to deal with Mexicans on terms of equal citizenship”).
79. The California Constitution granted suffrage to “every white male citizen of the United
States, and every white male citizen of Mexico, who shall have elected to become a citizen of the
United States, under the treaty of [Guadalupe Hidalgo] . . . of the age of twenty-one years who
shall have been a resident of the state six months next preceding the election.” CAL. CONST. of
1849, art. II, § 1.
80. See, e.g., People ex rel. Kimberly v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 339 (1870) (upholding
full citizenship of a “white male [former] citizen of Mexico” while noting that other races, al-
though still American citizens under the treaty, may be denied certain political rights, such as
the franchise).
81. In recent years, “race” has been used as a verb connoting the assignment of racial iden-
tification (e.g., “Through its reasoning, the court raced Jan White.”) in addition to the related
traditional use of “race” as a noun (e.g., “Ryan’s race is African American.”). For examples of
the use of “race” as a verb, see generally RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS
ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992); Katherine M. Franke, What Does a White Woman Look Like? Racing and
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zenship failed to recognize that Latinos did not have the social privi-
leges that came with being White. Latino children often attended seg-
regated schools; Latino neighborhoods were segregated from White
neighborhoods; and Latinos suffered from employment discrimina-
tion.82 This characterization of Latinos as White is an outgrowth of the
legacy of slavery. African Americans were not guaranteed United
States citizenship until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868, yet to have classified Latinos as African American would have
been difficult for nineteenth century courts, given the clarity of the
two groups’ different geographical origins.
The recognition of Whites’ and Latinos’ different societal experi-
ences formed the crux of the Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Her-
nandez v. Texas,83 where the Court grappled with Latinos’ racial iden-
tity for the first and last time.84 In Hernandez, a jury in Jackson
County, Texas, convicted Pete Hernandez, a Latino, of murder. He
challenged his conviction on equal protection grounds—because La-
tinos were “systematically excluded” from jury service in Jackson
County, Hernandez claimed he had not been tried by a jury of his
peers.85 The Court held that because Latinos constituted a “separate
class” from Whites and African Americans in Jackson County, as
demonstrated by “the attitude of the community,” the systematic ex-
clusion of Latinos from jury service violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.86 Although the Court specifically rejected the idea of “only two
Erasing in Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1231 (1996); Judy Scales-Trent, Notes of a White Black
Woman, reprinted in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, supra note 28, at 475, 476 (“‘Race’ is not some-
thing that just exists. It is a continuing act of imagination. It is a very demanding verb.”).
82. George A. Martinez, African Americans, Latinos and the Construction of Race: Toward
an Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 213, 215 (1998).
83. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
84.  López, supra note 5, at 60.
85. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 476-77.
86. Id. at 479. The Court further noted:
Here the testimony of responsible officials and citizens contained the admission that
residents of the community distinguished between “white” and “Mexican.” The par-
ticipation of persons of Mexican descent in business and community groups was
shown to be slight. Until very recent times, children of Mexican descent were re-
quired to attend a segregated school for the first four grades. At least one restaurant
in town prominently displayed a sign announcing “No Mexicans Served.” On the
courthouse grounds at the time of the hearing, there were two men’s toilets, one un-
marked, and the other marked “Colored Men” and “Hombres Aqui” (“Men Here”).
No substantial evidence was offered to rebut the logical inference drawn from these
facts . . . .
Id. at 479-80.
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classes—white and Negro,”87 its emphasis on racial and ethnic rela-
tions in Jackson County implies a preference for a case-by-case analy-
sis that limits the Court’s protection of Latinos to the specific com-
munity involved, rather than assuming that such classification triggers
strict scrutiny generally.88 The Court did not conclude that Latinos
were racially Non-White, but its holding reveals an acknowledgement
of the differences between Whites and Latinos. The decision defines
Whites and Latinos as distinct groups.
With one exception, the United States Census Bureau has raced
Latinos White. As required by Article I, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution, the decennial census has been conducted every
ten years since 1790.89 Respondents to the 1930 Census were given the
option to designate that they belonged to the “Mexican race,” but due
to objections by Mexican Americans, this racial category was re-
moved.90 Since the 1940 Census, Latinos have been presumed racially
White unless designated otherwise.91 In 1970, the census asked
whether the respondent’s ethnic identity was “Hispanic,”92 but this
question reached merely 5% of respondents because it appeared only
on the census long form.93 Since the 1980 Census, the Latino ethnicity
question has been asked on the standard short form in addition to the
race question, which respondents can now answer as White, Black,
Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian, or Other.94 In 1980, 40%
87. Id. at 477.
88. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (applying strict scru-
tiny, but finding that the classification was permissible); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
310 (1880) (applying heightened scrutiny in a dispute based upon racial classification).
89. U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfinder, at http://factfinder.census.gov/home/en/
decennialdata.html (May 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
90. ANDERSON & FEINBERG, supra note 71, at 182-83; see also RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42,
at 42 (describing changes in the U.S. Census).
91. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 102.
92. ANDERSON & FEINBERG, supra note 71, at 183.
93. Id.
94. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 6-7.
The Multiracial Category Movement (MCM) was formed partly in response to the lim-
ited racial categories used by the census. For a description of the reasoning of the MCM’s pro-
ponents, see generally Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW
& INEQ. 183 (1993) (describing the psychological and political motivations behind the efforts of
multiracial Americans to set appropriate census categories). This movement attempts to create
a wholly new racial designation, the multiracial category, in order to grapple with racial classifi-
cation of the growing number of biracial and multiracial persons in the United States. The lines
of physical appearance along which our society previously assigned race are becoming ever
more blurred because of an increasing number of children resulting from interracial marriage
and sexual relations. Id. at 185-88. But see Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin
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of Latinos classified themselves not as racially White but as “Other,”
compared to 3% of the non-Latino population.95 Twenty years later in
2000, 42% of the Latino population classified themselves as racially
“Other,” but only .1% of the non-Latino population did the same.96
Although sociologist Clara Rodríguez notes that the Census ap-
pears to be evolving towards a White–Non-White paradigm, this
change should not be seen as beneficial to Latinos.97 As will be dis-
cussed below, even though a White–Non-White paradigm may allow
more space for the Latino narrative than the Black–White binary
does, the White–Non-White paradigm used in school desegregation
litigation collapses all Non-White identities and promotes White
privilege.98 Furthermore, in the context of the U.S. Census, Latinos
will likely continue to be raced White even though they do not have
the social privileges of whiteness and in fact are the “poorest of the
poor.”99
Even if viewed as an ethnic group, Latinos suffer from the effects
of racism. Because of the differences in historical struggles, racism
against Latinos has “a different genesis” than racism perpetrated
against African Americans.100 Importantly, there often may be a dif-
ference in how Latinos conceive of their racial identity and how oth-
ers perceive them. For example, Puerto Ricans who might be consid-
ered White by Caribbean standards could easily be considered Black
by American standards.101 Latinos have discussed their experiences of
being “informed” by non-Latinos about their place in the ill-fitting
Black–White paradigm—some Latinos have been told that they are
Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1521-27 (2000) (criticizing the arguments in support of the Multiracial
Category Movement).
95. RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 130.
96. U.S. Census Bureau, USA Statistics in Brief—1990 and 2000 Census Race and Hispanic
Data, available at http://www.census.gov/statab/www/part1a.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
97. See RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 17:
An analysis of U.S. decennial census classifications shows the clear historical progres-
sion toward a more definitive bipolar structure . . . . evolution of two fundamental and
socially constructed polarities that place “whites” at one end and “other social races”
at the other. . . . It is with this historically evolved bipolar structure that groups who
have not been “quite white” or “quite black” have contended in the past, and it is in
this structure that Latinos and other groups are entangled today.
98. See infra notes 231-42 and accompanying text.
99. Mendieta, supra note 52, at 45; see also supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing the relative poverty of Latinos in America, as compared with the U.S. population as a
whole).
100. Perea, supra note 27, at 1253.
101. PAYNE, supra note 25, at 138-39.
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White, and some have been told that they are Black.102 These acts of
assigning a racial identity to Latinos reveal that Latinos are not raced
even consistently.103
This inconsistency is illustrated by an assumption that the U.S.
Census Bureau has perpetuated—that Latinos are racially White.
This leads directly to what Professor Richard Delgado labels the
“other white” strategy, a “logical extension of the kind of thinking the
black–white binary disposes you to.”104 The “other white” strategy
permits some people to believe that because a Latino is raced White,
he or she cannot be the subject of discrimination.105 When a White
person views a Latino as White, the White person may be less sympa-
thetic to the Latino’s claims of social injustice because, after all, the
Latino is White—not African American.106 If an African American
person views a Latino as White, this might cause further resentment
because of the Latino’s perceived goal of being treated as though he
or she is White.107 The discussion of what happens when Latinos are
viewed as White is not generally applicable, though, because Latinos
are primarily viewed as other than White, not as other Whites.108 This
situation illustrates once again Professor Juan Perea’s observation
that “Latinos do not fit the boxes supplied by the paradigm.”109
For purposes of determining their citizenship in the late nine-
teenth century, state courts told Latinos they were White. In 1954 in
Hernandez, the Supreme Court suggested that Latinos were a pro-
tected class, distinct from Whites. In non-legal discourse, Latinos
102. Clara Rodríguez relates the experiences of some of her Latino students:
Latino students have also told me that non-Latinos sometimes assume they are Afri-
can American. When they assert they are not “black” but Latino, they are either re-
proved for denying their “race” or told they are out of touch with reality. Other Lati-
nos, who see whites as other-than-me, are told by non-Latinos, “But you’re white.”
Although not all Latinos have such dramatic experiences, almost all know (and are
often related to) others who have.
RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 4.
103. López, supra note 5, at 97 (“Latinos are routinely characterized as being of every
race.”).
104. DELGADO, supra note 33, at 114.
105. Id.
106. See Perea, supra note 27, at 1231-32 (“Whites can ignore our claims to justice, since we
are not Black and therefore are not subject to real racism.”).
107. Id; see also Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to Dismantle That Famous
House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 294 (2000) (“Not only does binary thinking conceal the check-
erboard of racial progress and retrenchment, it can hide the way dominant society often casts
minority groups against one another, to the detriment of both.”).
108. Wildman, supra note 58, at 310.
109. Perea, supra note 27, at 1232.
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“have been categorized as irreducibly Other and non-white.”110 How-
ever, the U.S. Census Bureau continues to race Latinos White, but
with the restriction that Latinos are the only named White ethnic
group.111 The Latino identity is not clear because it does not fit within
the popular, but incorrect ways of thinking about race and ethnicity.
When those false frameworks are applied in the context of school de-
segregation, Latinos are denied equal opportunity at the very funda-
mental level of public education.
II.  DE JURE SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE
LATINO EXPERIENCE
School segregation, as well as desegregation efforts, have been
viewed in a Black–White binary historically. Even when this binary
was replaced by a White–Non-White binary, the Latino history of
educational segregation was overlooked. The first step in under-
standing Latinos’ contemporary experiences in segregated schools is
to review the historical foundations of such segregation. During the
early twentieth century, Latinos were raced White in some contexts
but segregated from Whites in schools. The first successful case to
challenge this segregation in federal court, Mendez v. Westminster,112
was decided in 1946. Although Mendez foreshadowed Brown v.
Board of Education and played a prominent role in dismantling the
system of de facto educational segregation in the United States,
Brown did not render the segregation of Latinos unconstitutional.
A. Latino School Segregation: A Historical Primer
Public elementary education was not widespread in the United
States until the mid-nineteenth century.113 Public secondary education
was not common until the early twentieth century.114 School systems
often grew as de jure segregated systems; in the South, state or local
governments frequently required the segregation of White and Afri-
110. Martinez, supra note 82, at 215.
111. Both the 2000 Census short form and long form listed only ethnic groups of Latino
derivation. See United States Census 2000, at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d61a.pdf
(last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (short form) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); United States
Census 2000, at http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/d-61b.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2001) (long
form) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
112. 64 F. Supp. 544 (1946).
113. Education Week on the Web, Timeline, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/vol-18/20tline.h18
(Jan. 20, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
114. Id.
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can American students by law. Professor Mark Tushnet describes the
role de jure segregated schools played in maintaining African Ameri-
can subordination, calling segregated schools “a visible and daily
demonstration to children as they were growing up that whites did
not consider them fit to associate with.”115 De jure segregation also af-
fected Latinos, who, although they were viewed by courts as White
for the basic—though not insignificant—purpose of citizenship, were
viewed by their communities as categorically Non-White and segre-
gated as such: “Jim Crow, in addition to targeting Blacks, also took
aim at Latinos through segregated schools and other public facili-
ties.”116 It was almost insignificant that Latinos were White for pur-
poses of citizenship, because they were not White for the purposes of
enjoying the benefits citizenship should confer, such as education.
Writing in 1920, educator Grace Stanley noted the role the local
community played in the creation and perpetuation of an educational
system that segregated Latinos:
One of the first demands made from a community in which there is a
large Mexican population is for a separate school. The reasons ad-
vanced for this demand are generally from a selfish viewpoint of the
English-speaking public and are based largely on the theory that the
Mexican is a menace to the health and morals of the rest of the
community.117
In the early twentieth century, the Latino population in the United
States was concentrated in the southwest. At this time, the segrega-
tion of Latinos in California took the form of “Mexican schools” and
“migratory schools.”118 Not surprisingly, these schools were plagued
by “inadequate resources, poor equipment, and unfit building con-
struction,” their teachers were paid less than teachers at the White
schools, and a promotion for a teacher at a Latino school often con-
sisted of being transferred to the White school.119 While these districts
were not required by state statute to segregate Latino students, their
actions would be characterized under contemporary standards as de
115. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 116 (1994).
116. PEREA, supra note 78, at 304.
117. CHARLES WOLLENBURG, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND EXCLUSION
IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, 1855-1975, at 111 (1976) (quoting Grace Stanley, Special School for
Mexicans, SURVEY, Sept. 15, 1920, at 714).
118. GILBERT G. GONZALEZ, CHICANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF SEGREGATION 103
(1990).
119. Id. at 22.
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jure segregation because of the districts’ prejudice-based intent to
educate separately Latino and White students.120
In California the establishment of segregated schools occurred
“in town after Southern California town” as Latino schools were de-
veloped in Pasadena (1913), Mendota (1920), Santa Ana (1920), On-
tario (mid-1920s), Riverside (unofficial in 1910, but specially built in
1924), and Los Angeles (by 1933).121 The system of segregation was
often justified by race-based claims that Latinos simply were not as
smart as Whites. In the words of one school superintendent, “Some
Mexicans are very bright, but you can’t compare their brightest with
the average white children. They are an inferior race.”122 The common
occurrence of Latino school segregation was confirmed in a 1931 sur-
vey of school districts with large Latino populations, demonstrating
that over 80% of these districts were officially segregated and many
of the remaining 20% had “unofficial” segregatory practices such as
“Americanization” classrooms,123 which continued through the
1950s.124 Although these programs had the ultimate goal of assimilat-
ing Latinos into American society and training them for “appropri-
ate” jobs, those purposes were pursued by isolating Latino students
during most of their years as elementary and secondary school stu-
dents.125
While nearly one hundred school desegregation or education-
related racial discrimination cases were brought in the nineteenth
century,126 the march toward equality was slow, and the first stuttering
steps of progress occurred in state courts. The first known court-
ordered school desegregation was rendered by a county court in 1931
in Lemon Grove, California.127 In 1930, Latinos and Whites attended
the Lemon Grove elementary school in nearly equal numbers, with a
total enrollment of 169.128 The Lemon Grove school board planned to
120. For a discussion of the contemporary standards of intent, see infra note 275 and ac-
companying text. While there is variation among these standards, the California schools’ actions
in the early twentieth century meet the requirements of each variation.
121. WOLLENBURG, supra note 117, at 112.
122. López, supra note 5, at 111-12 (quoting an unidentified school superintendent).
123. WOLLENBURG, supra note 117, at 116.
124. Id.
125. GONZALEZ, supra note 118, at 22.
126. Caroline Hendrie, In Black and White, EDUC. WK., Mar. 24, 1999, at 31, available at
http://www.edweek.com/ew/vol-18/28deseg.h18.
127. ROBERT R. ALVAREZ, JR., FAMILIA 154 (1987).
128. Robert R. Alvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s First Successful School
Desegregation Court Case, J. SAN DIEGO HIST., Spring 1986, at 116, 118.
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segregate Latino elementary students by building a new school spe-
cifically for Latinos.129 When the Latino students were instructed to
attend school in this barn-like building, Latino parents first organized
a boycott of the separate school.130 Then they filed a claim in the Su-
perior Court of San Diego County alleging that the district was un-
lawfully segregating Latino students.131 At the same time, the segrega-
tion of Latinos was a topic on the California legislature’s agenda, and
a bill to permit the segregation of Latinos was defeated, due in part,
perhaps, to the Lemon Grove case.132 Back in Lemon Grove, the court
required the school district to justify its proposed segregation of La-
tino students, and the district responded with the rationale of
“Americanization.”133 The municipal court ruled in favor of the La-
tino plaintiffs and prohibited segregation of White and Latino stu-
dents.134 The remedial order followed two days later and made clear
that “the laws of the State of California do not authorize or permit
the establishment or maintenance of separate schools for the instruc-
tion of pupils of Mexican parentage, nationality, and/or descent.”135
The court considered the state law permitting the segregation of Afri-
can and Indian students and concluded that because Latinos were not
African or Indian, their segregation was not defensible under state
law.136 The case was not appealed, and it was never mentioned in the
minutes of a Lemon Grove school board meeting.137
In the early twentieth century, the educational segregation of La-
tinos was common throughout California and Texas.138 The trial
court’s holding in the Lemon Grove case was an anomaly. A more
typical outcome had been reached by a Texas court one year earlier
in Independent School District v. Salvatierra.139 When Jesus Salvatierra
and other local taxpayers in Del Rio, Texas, brought a suit to chal-
129. Id. at 118.
130. Id.
131. Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66625 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego County filed Apr. 17, 1931) (at-
tached as Appendix).
132. Alvarez, supra note 128, at 125, 128.
133. Id. at 129.
134. Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66625 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego County filed Apr. 17, 1931).
135. Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66625 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego County filed Apr. 21, 1931) (or-
der issuing peremptory writ of mandate) (attached as Appendix).
136. See San Diego Mexican & Chicano History, What was the Lemon Grove School
Desegregation Case All About?, at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/mas/chicanohistory/
chapter07/c07s02.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
137. Alvarez, supra note 128, at 131.
138. Id. at 121.
139. 33 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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lenge plans to increase the segregation of Latino students, the trial
court issued an injunction prohibiting further segregation.140 The
Texas appellate court reversed, stating that although segregation of
Latinos from students of “other white races”141 for arbitrary or mali-
cious reasons would not be permitted, the separation was permissible
in this case because it was based on acceptable pedagogical reasons.142
The appellate court allowed the district to segregate Latino students
in early elementary grades for the educational reasons that the mi-
grant schedule affected the length of time Latino students could at-
tend school each year, and, relatedly, that the English language often
presented special challenges for Latino students.143
This system of widespread Latino segregation in the Southwest
persisted until the late 1940s and early 1950s,144 when community
groups, professional educators, and educational psychologists op-
posed segregation on a large scale.145 Their opposition was supported
by the weight of the federal courts, which quashed segregation as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
The most notable battle was fought in the federal courts in California.
B. Violation of Equal Protection: The Federal Courts Step In
In 1929, California Attorney General U.S. Webb issued an advi-
sory opinion concluding that the segregation of Latino students could
not be defended under California law.146 This advisory opinion clearly
did not halt the segregation practices in California public schools. In
fact, it seems to have had no direct impact at all. Nonetheless, just as
Latino parents had prompted Attorney General Webb to issue his
ruling, they continued their work as activists throughout the state. In
the town of Westminster, California, where the schools were segre-
gated, Gonzalo Mendez and other Latino parents worked with the
school board to propose a ballot initiative approving the issuance of
140. Id. at 793-94.
141. Id. at 795.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 791-92, 795.
144. GONZALEZ, supra note 118, at 22.
145. WOLLENBURG, supra note 117, at 118-23. Consider the many groups participating as
amici in Brown: the United States, the ACLU, the American Federation of Teachers, the
American Jewish Congress, the American Veterans Committee, Inc., the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, and the many social scientists who provided the appendix to the appellant’s
brief. See infra notes 168, 172 and accompanying text.
146. WOLLENBURG, supra note 117, at 123.
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bonds to finance the construction of an integrated school.147 However,
when the bond proposal failed, board action ceased.148 In nearby
Santa Ana, William Guzman and other Latino parents attempted to
work with their school board to further integrate schools by increas-
ing the size of the transfer program within the district.149 This school
board, too, was unreceptive to the Latino parents’ proposals. Not
only did it refuse to increase the transfer program, but it also further
restricted the limited number of transfers available.150 Mendez and
Guzman challenged the decisions of these school boards to perpetu-
ate segregation by becoming two of the five primary plaintiffs in
Mendez v. Westminster School District,151 the case historian Gilbert
Gonzalez describes as “[t]he most significant court case affecting the
de jure segregation of Mexican children in the Southwest.”152
The Mendez suit was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, and the claim was filed in a California
federal district court in 1945.153 While the school districts claimed to
segregate students for the purpose of language instruction, the district
court concluded that the student assignment process was sometimes
completed on the basis of the student’s name alone, with no knowl-
edge of the student’s English language proficiency.154 Latino students
in California never were segregated at the demand of a state statute,
but the district court concluded in Mendez that because the practice
of segregating Latinos in public schools violated the state and federal
constitutions,155 the plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief so the
defendant school districts could no longer segregate Latino stu-
dents.156 Specifically, the court held:
“The equal protection of the laws” pertaining to the public school
system in California is not provided by furnishing in separate schools
the same technical facilities, text books and courses of instruction to
children of Mexican ancestry that are available to the other public
school children regardless of their ancestry. A paramount requisite




151. 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946).
152. GONZALEZ, supra note 118, at 28.
153. WOLLENBURG, supra note 117, at 108.
154. Mendez, 64 F. Supp. at 550.
155. Id. at 549.
156. Id. at 551.
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in the American system of public education is social equality. It must
be open to all children by unified school association regardless of
lineage.157
Importantly, the district court discussed a state statute under which
schools could legally segregate students.158 This statute was the succes-
sor to the statute reviewed in the Lemon Grove case and was titled
“Schools for Indian children, and children of Chinese, Japanese, or
Mongolian parentage.”159 Similar to the municipal court in the Lemon
Grove case, the federal district court concluded that the statute was
“not pertinent to this action”160 because, as the court had previously
noted, “[i]t is conceded by all parties that there is no question of race
discrimination in this action.”161 While the plaintiff class was described
as those of Mexican “extraction,” “descent,” or “ancestry,”162 their
race was not disputed because the court presumed that the Latino
plaintiffs were racially White.163 The NAACP filed a cautious amicus
brief in Mendez at the appellate level, introducing social science evi-
dence about the general harm of segregation.164 Another amicus brief
filed by lawyer and historian Carey McWilliams focused on the spe-
cific harm of segregation in the educational context.165 The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, but the
social science evidence was not part of its reported decision.166
An unsigned student note in the Yale Law Journal one year after
Mendez noted prophetically that Mendez “has questioned the basic
assumption of the Plessy case. . . . Modern sociological and psycho-
logical studies lend much support to the District Court’s views. A dual
school system, even if ‘equal facilities’ were even in fact provided,
157. Id. at 549.
158. Id. at 548 n.5.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 548.
161. Id. at 546.
162. Id.
163. GONZALEZ, supra note 118, at 152.
164. Delgado, supra note 107, at 304.
165. Id. at 304-05.
166. The Ninth Circuit concluded:
By enforcing the segregation of school children of Mexican descent against their will
and contrary to the laws of California, respondents have violated the federal law as
provided in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by depriving
them of liberty and property without due process of law and by denying to them the
equal protection of the laws.
Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947).
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does imply social inferiority.”167 This comment is particularly insight-
ful because neither court in Mendez took the step that Brown later
did of connecting social science studies about segregation to the harm
that must be redressed by a court’s remedial order. This social science
evidence became well known in academic circles a decade after Men-
dez and was attached as an appendix to appellants’ briefs in Brown.168
Writing many years after both Mendez and Brown, historian Charles
Wollenburg’s words reminded readers of the context in which Men-
dez must be understood: Mendez “was part of a process which
stripped away the formal structure of legalized segregation and ex-
posed the underlying conditions of racism and reaction that divide the
American people and plague their consciences.”169
The next major step towards achieving equal educational oppor-
tunity for all students—and the one known by most Americans to-
day—was the landmark 1954 decision Brown v. Board of Education.170
While Brown declared in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s now famous
words that “[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual,”171 it omitted any reference to Mendez or, indeed, to Latino seg-
regation at all. A distinction can be drawn that the Brown decision
was premised on racial segregation, which had not been directly at is-
sue in Mendez, according to the district court. Factual distinctions
aside, the reasoning in Mendez not only was rare in American juris-
prudence, it also was quite applicable to Brown. Inequality based on
separation is unconstitutional when the separation is premised on a
fallacious assumption of difference. Despite this analytical similarity,
neither the parties nor amici in Brown cited Mendez in their briefs to
the Supreme Court.172 The fact that the Court did not mention Men-
167. Note, Segregation in Public Schools—A Violation of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 56
YALE L.J. 1059, 1060 (1947).
168. See 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41-66 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS] (reprinting the statement authored by thirty-two social
scientists in various disciplines and filed as an appendix to the appellants’ brief in Brown).
169. WOLLENBURG, supra note 117, at 135.
170. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also David J. Garrow, The Supreme Court’s Pursuit of Equality
and Liberty and the Burdens of History, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 205, 205 (Neal Devins &
Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion is commonly regarded as the signal event in the modern quest for racial equality.”) (citation
omitted).
171. 347 U.S. at 495.
172. See 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 168, at 24-26 (reprinting the table of cases in the
appellants’ brief before the initial oral argument); id. at 68-69 (reprinting the table of cases in
the appellees’ brief before the initial oral argument); id. at 114-15 (reprinting the table of cases
in the United States’ amicus brief before the initial oral argument); id. at 151-53 (reprinting the
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dez is especially surprising in light of Chief Justice Warren’s personal
experience:
[T]he Mendez decision . . . led to California’s repeal of its school
segregation statutes. Then Governor Earl Warren signed legislation
repealing California’s segregation statutes on June 14, 1947. This
was, of course, the same Earl Warren who, as Chief Justice of the
United States, would later pen the opinions in Brown v. Board of
Education and Hernandez v. Texas.173
The Court decided Brown a mere twelve days after it announced its
opinion in Hernandez v. Texas, 174 where the Court declared Latinos to
be a protected class in the context of jury eligibility.175 Interestingly,
Latino school segregation was noted as an indicator of Latinos’ so-
cially created “difference” in Hernandez.176 Therefore, the Court was
considering the issues of Latino identity and of school desegregation
concurrently. Because the Court carefully dodged the question of La-
tinos’ racial identity in Hernandez, though, it is not surprising that the
Court did not address the question of Latino school segregation in
Brown. After all, Brown occurred within the familiar Black–White
binary.
table of cases in the ACLU’s amicus brief before the initial oral argument); id. at 197 (reprinting
the table of cases in the American Federation of Teachers’s amicus brief before the initial oral
argument); id. at 217-18 (reprinting the table of cases in the American Jewish Congress’s amicus
brief before the initial oral argument); id. at 242-43 (reprinting the table of cases in the Ameri-
can Veterans Committee’s, Inc., amicus brief before the initial oral argument); id. at 263-75 (re-
printing the Congress of Industrial Organizations’s amicus brief before the initial oral argu-
ment); id. at 488-92 (reprinting the table of cases in the appellants’ brief prior to reargument);
id. at 750 (reprinting the table of cases in the Board of Education’s brief prior to reargument);
id. at 761 (reprinting the table of cases in the state of Kansas’s brief prior to reargument); id. at
855-58 (reprinting the table of cases in the United States’ amicus brief prior to reargument);
49A LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 168, at 400 (reprinting the table of cases in the American
Federation of Teachers’s amicus brief prior to reargument); id. at 428-29 (reprinting the table of
cases in the American Veterans Committee’s amicus brief prior to reargument).
173. Perea, supra note 27, at 1247 (citations omitted). Though his role in uniting the Court
in Brown is commendable, Chief Justice Warren was not a civil rights hero for all groups. His
role in confining Japanese Americans to internment camps while serving as California’s Attor-
ney General comes to mind. See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN
120-23 (1997) (describing Warren’s leading role in the internment of Japanese Americans dur-
ing World War II).
174. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
175. Id. at 476-80.
176. Id. at 479.
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III.  THE WHITE–NON-WHITE PARADIGM IN
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
The Black–White binary of the past forced Latinos into one of
two categories when they fit into neither. The frequent racing of Lati-
nos as White by the courts did not lead to similar experiences for
Whites and Latinos. In 1973, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the
White–Non-White paradigm and designation of Latinos as Non-
White in Keyes v. School District No. 1177 would seem to have bene-
fited Latinos. Instead, this new framework merely continued to keep
Latinos invisible. The inequality resulting from Latinos’ invisibility
will continue as long as racial and ethnic groups are defined by refer-
ence to the normalized standard of White.
A. The Supreme Court Speaks
While Brown introduced the Black–White paradigm into school
desegregation litigation, Keyes v. School District No. 1, challenging
school segregation in Denver, introduced the White–Non-White
paradigm into Supreme Court jurisprudence nearly twenty years
later.178 Keyes has been hailed as the decision that brought school de-
segregation to the North. Notably, it was the first Supreme Court case
to hold that statutory segregation was not required for a district to be
found liable for de jure segregation.179 Thus, Keyes was the basis for a
new wave of litigation. However, Keyes almost never is recognized for
its significant holding that Latino students should be classified with
African American students as Non-White for purposes of school de-
segregation.180
For sixteen years, no court interpreted Brown to prohibit the
segregation of Latino students. Then, in a span of three months in
1970, two federal district courts held that Latinos should be consid-
ered distinct from Whites in the context of school desegregation.181 In
177. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 201.
180. For example, this aspect of Keyes is omitted from notable Constitutional Law case-
books. See infra notes 288-92 and accompanying text.
181. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 606 (S.D. Tex. 1970)
(finding that “Mexican-American students are an identifiable, ethnic-minority class sufficient to
bring them within the protection of Brown”); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D.
Colo. 1970) (“It would seem that to the extent that Hispanos, as a group, are isolated in concen-
trated numbers, a school in which this has occurred is to be regarded as a segregated
school . . . .”) . The district court’s opinion in Keyes was reported in two parts. See Keyes v. Sch.
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the Corpus Christi, Texas, school district, nearly half the students
were Latino, nearly half were White, and approximately 4% were Af-
rican American.182 In the case arising out of this school system, Cis-
neros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, the district court
held that Brown protected Latino students183 and that the segregation
of both Non-White groups resulted in a constitutionally impermissible
dual school system.184 The Fifth Circuit affirmed two years later, cor-
rectly anticipating the Court’s decision in Keyes. 185
Similarly, in Denver the demographic composition of the public
school system in 1968 did not fit the Black–White binary: approxi-
mately 71% of the students were White, 13% were African Ameri-
can, and 16% were Latino.186 Aware of this problem, the school board
adopted resolutions to desegregate the Denver schools by changing
attendance boundaries.187 Before the resolutions were fully imple-
mented, however, a newly elected school board rescinded the resolu-
tions and implemented a voluntary exchange program.188 In the school
desegregation suit filed in 1968, Keyes v. School District No. 1, the dis-
trict court found the school system liable for intentional segregation
and entered a remedial order.189 The district court considered Latinos
Non-White190 and concluded that a Denver school with 70-75% Latino
or African American students would be considered impermissibly ra-
cially identifiable.191 It distinguished between Latino and African
American students192 and noted the “desirability (even though it is not
constitutionally mandated) of having both Negroes and Hispanos in
Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D. Colo. 1970) (making findings of fact and law) and Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970) (prescribing a remedy).
182. Cisneros, 324 F. Supp. at 611 n.37.
183. Id. at 606.
184. Id. at 620. The district court also found that the segregation was de jure even though it
resulted not from a statute, but from a series of actions taken by the district. Id. at 617-20.
185. The Fifth Circuit affirmed both the finding of unconstitutional segregation and the
remedy ordered, with leave to amend the remedy “as the practicalities of the situation require in
order to avoid undue hardships or burdens on the School Board.” Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 167 (5th Cir. 1972).
186. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990, 996 n.1 (10th Cir. 1971).
187. Id. at 996-97.
188. Id.
189. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 83-85 (D. Colo. 1970) (holding the district
liable and beginning the discussion of a remedy); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90, 91-
99 (discussing the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ proposals and instituting a remedial order).
190. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D. Colo. 1970).
191. Id. at 77.
192. Id. at 69.
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the desegregated schools on as close to an equal basis as possible.”193
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
the case, but it did not question the designation of Latinos as Non-
White.194
When Keyes was argued in the Supreme Court one year later (in
1972), 66% of students in the Denver school system were White, 14%
were African American, and 20% were Latino.195 The Supreme Court
held in part that on remand the district court in Keyes should consider
African Americans and Latinos to be part of the same group for pur-
poses of school desegregation.196 Denver schools that had 70-75% La-
tino students, African American students, or a combination of Latino
and African American students were held to be impermissibly racially
identifiable.197 The Court acknowledged its decision in Hernandez v.
Texas198 that Latinos can constitute a constitutionally protected class
but relied upon the report of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights to conclude that “though of different origins, Negroes and
Hispanos in Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when
compared with the treatment afforded Anglo students.”199 Thus, the
Court announced no reason to distinguish between Latino and Afri-
can American students.
In Keyes, the Supreme Court collapsed the Latino and African
American narratives of segregation and discrimination by making La-
tinos, who had been raced White by courts (and would continue to be
raced White by the U.S. Census Bureau), Non-White for purposes of
school desegregation. These new lines of group identification are eas-
ily recognizable in the terms “minority” and “majority,”—meant to
be racial and ethnic descriptions—which pervade not only contempo-
rary school desegregation litigation, but also American popular cul-
ture. The employment of the White–Non-White paradigm through
the use of “minority” and “majority” classifications leads to a shallow
understanding of the range of educational experiences among Non-
193. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 90, 100 (D. Colo. 1970).
194. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F. 2d 990, 1007 (10th Cir. 1971).
195. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1., 413 U.S. 189, 195 (1973).
196. Id. at 197-98.
197. Id.
198. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
199. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 197-98.
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White students. By denying these differences, courts do not allow Af-
rican Americans and Latinos to benefit similarly from Brown.200
The numerous districts found liable in school desegregation cases
filed in the 1970s and 1980s now have been subject to the oversight of
federal district courts for two or more decades, and many districts are
seeking declarations of unitary status.201 A unitary status decree in-
volves a finding that the school district in question is no longer oper-
ating an impermissible de jure segregated dual system and therefore
can be released from the oversight of the federal courts.202
The Court’s language in its unitary status decisions echoes the
White–Non-White paradigm articulated in Keyes. The Court contin-
ued to take the lead in elaborating the White–Non-White paradigm in
Jenkins III,203 using the term “minority”204 to describe Non-White ra-
200. For a discussion of the different educational experiences of Latinos and African
Americans, see infra notes 212-30 and accompanying text. The differences in the specific con-
text of school desegregation are discussed infra at notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
201. Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1157-58
(2000).
202. Ultimately, the determination of unitary status is based upon an evaluation of the six
factors articulated by the Supreme Court in 1968 in Green v. County School Board: student at-
tendance patterns, faculty assignments, staff assignments, transportation, extra-curricular activi-
ties, and school facilities. 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). In 1992, the Court in Freeman v. Pitts modi-
fied Green by allowing federal courts “to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in
incremental stages, before full compliance [had been] achieved in every area of school opera-
tions.” 503 U.S. 467, 490-91 (1992).
The Freeman test requires that federal courts apply the following three criteria to each
of the Green factors: compliance in the specific area in which the school district is seeking re-
lease, a determination of whether judicial control is necessary to achieve the remainder of the
remedial order, and the school district’s good faith effort to comply with the remedial order. Id.
at 491. The district’s good faith effort (a criterion introduced one year prior to Freeman in
Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991)), is not defeated by a lack of
achievement of the desired results; good faith compliance may exist where “vestiges of past dis-
crimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable.” Freeman, 503 U.S. at 492. Thus, a
district can reassign its teachers and staff in a racially equitable manner (considering the race of
the teachers, the race of the students, and teachers’ and staff members’ levels of experience) and
be released from court control about matters of teacher and staff assignments, even though the
district’s processes of student assignment may continue to be within the jurisdiction of the court.
Id.
A school district’s incentives to obtain a “unitary status” decree will be diminished if
the district can be declared “partially unitary.” If a district can be declared “partially unitary,”
the district can significantly reduce the degree of court supervision (albeit not completely) with
something less than total compliance.
203. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
204. Id. at 87, 94 nn.6, 101-02 & 119.
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cial and ethnic groups.205 Rather than the term “majority,” the Jenkins
III Court used “non-minority.”206 These terms—and thus this para-
digm—have saturated federal district courts. When rendering deci-
sions on motions for unitary status as recently as the past two years,
federal district judges have measured desegregation in terms of “mi-
nority” and “majority” populations in Topeka, Kansas;207 Autauga
County, Alabama;208 Woodland Hills, Pennsylvania;209 Yonkers, New
York;210 and Benton Harbor, Michigan.211 The White–Non-White
paradigm is alive and well in federal district courts across the country.
B. Why Difference Matters: The Contemporary Latino Educational
Experience
While Latinos and African Americans share the common bond
of being consistently viewed as other-than-White in the context of
school desegregation litigation, significant differences between the
two groups remain. The differences start on a fundamental level:
while African Americans are presumed to have United States citizen-
ship and to have been socialized as Americans, this presumption does
not exist for non–African American Non-Whites, including Latinos.212
An additional presumption of “foreignness” layered upon Latinos’
group identity relates to language.213 Because approximately one-third
205. Id. at 76, 78, 142-44. Translating this term into the White–Non-White paradigm results
in a term reminiscent of an awkward, though technically accurate foreign language translation:
“non-minority” becomes “Non–Non-White.”
206. Id.
207. Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1212-14 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding
that the district had satisfied the demands of the remedy and was therefore declared unitary).
208. Lee v. Autauga County Bd. of Educ., 59 F. Supp. 1199, 1201-02 n.12, 1208 & 1210
(M.D. Ala. 1999) (denying the defendant’s motion for unitary status).
209. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 118 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580-81, 584, 586 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (denying
the defendant’s motion for unitary status).
210. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 123 F. Supp. 2d 694, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(denying a request for unitary status and indicating that a modified remedial order would fol-
low). Interestingly, the court in Yonkers declared that “minority” students for the purposes of
this case are Latino and African American students, while “majority” students are White and
Asian American students. Id. at 706.
211. See Berry v. Sch. Dist., 56 F. Supp. 2d 866, 876 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (discussing the obli-
gations of a charter school in a school district currently under court order and suggesting that
the district could be granted unitary status in 2002).
212. Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the “Miss Saigon Syndrome,” in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087, 1096 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992).
213. This presumption is illustrated by my own understanding of race and ethnicity as a
four-year-old child. One Saturday morning, as I accompanied my father on weekend errands,
we stopped to talk with one of his friends (accompanied by his own five-year-old daughter) who
was coming out of my father’s barber shop just as we were going in. My father’s friend was
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of all Latinos in the United States tend to be immigrants,214 more La-
tinos (than Whites or African Americans) have a need to improve
their English language skills. The recent “English only” movement,
echoed in the attacks on bilingual education, reveals hostility to
Spanish speakers and emphasizes the presumption of foreignness.215
Latinos recognize these many layers of assumptions when they are
manifested in the form of discrimination against Latinos as an identi-
fiable group.216
Latinos’ socioeconomic inequality vis-à-vis Whites and African
Americans is echoed in the educational realm. Latinos have the high-
est high school drop-out rates: in 1998, 30% (1.5 million) of Latinos
aged sixteen to twenty-four had dropped out of school, compared to
only 8% of Whites and 14% of African Americans the same age.217 Of
the dropouts, 40% of the Latinos had less than a ninth-grade educa-
tion when they left school, compared to 13% of Whites and 11% of
African Americans.218 Although the number of Latinos attending a
college or university has increased dramatically over the past twenty
White, and the five year-old that accompanied him was his adopted Korean American daughter.
When my father and I entered the barber shop after our brief pause for conversation, I offered
the perplexed observation that the other little girl “has Chinese eyes, but she talks right.”
Somehow, I had the discretion (thankfully) not to make this statement during our conversation.
This girl was probably the first Non-White person with whom I substantively interacted. My
church and preschool were essentially all-White. It is likely, therefore, that my assumptions
were gleaned from television and from the media more generally.
214. Mendieta, supra note 57, at 127.
215. For example, a naturalized Latina citizen was ordered by a court in 1995 to speak Eng-
lish to her young daughter because to do otherwise is, in the court’s words, “abusing that child.”
Diane Jennings, Judge Orders Amarillo Mother to Speak English to Daughter: Not Doing So Is
“Abusing” Child, He Rules in Custody Case, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29, 1995, at 1A.
216. See RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 42, at 20 (“In one of the largest and most comprehensive
surveys of Latinos, 80 percent of Mexicans, 74 percent of Puerto Ricans, and 47 percent of Cu-
bans reported ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ discrimination against their own group, a general perception that
appeared unrelated to skin color.”); see also Yzaguirre & Kamasaki, supra note 53, at 1-2 (pro-
viding an overview of the “scope and degree of discrimination against Hispanic Americans with
respect to employment and housing”).
217. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COMM’N ON EDUC. EXCELLENCE FOR HISPANIC AMS.,
CREATING THE WILL: HISPANICS ACHIEVING EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE 24 (2000) [herein-
after CREATING THE WILL]. These figures did not change between 1994 and 1998. See DAVIS,
supra note 5, at 111 (reporting similar figures for 1994 of a 30% dropout rate among Latinos,
8% among Whites, and 13% among African Americans).
218. White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for Hispanic Ams., State of Education for
Hispanic Americans, in Our Nation on the Fault Line: Hispanic American Education, at http://
www.ed.gov/pubs/FaultLine/state.html (Sept. 1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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years,219 Latinos still attend a college or university in lower propor-
tions than Whites or African Americans.220
The disparities reach beyond the realm of attendance and
graduation rates. Social science research has rarely focused on the
contemporary educational segregation of Latinos, but the limited re-
search in this area suggests that Latinos suffer disproportionately
from school segregation.221 The President’s Advisory Commission on
Educational Excellence for Hispanic Americans has reported that La-
tinos are “more segregated” and “more concentrated in high-poverty
schools than any other group of students.”222 Latinos’ concentration in
high-poverty schools has increased at an alarming rate: between 1988
and 1993, the likelihood that a Latino student would be in a high pov-
erty school increased from 14% to 40%.223 Comparable rates for
Whites increased from 7% to 8%, and African Americans’ likelihood
increased from 11% to 25%.224 Latino school segregation has “re-
mained in an unbroken pattern of increasing segregation” since the
1960s,225 and it dramatically increased in the 1970s and 1980s.226
Although segregated Latino schools often share characteristics of
segregated African American schools (poorer students than in White
or integrated schools, lower levels of competition, significantly higher
dropout rates, and low scores on college entrance exams by those who
219. See Daren Fonda, The Male Minority, TIME, Dec. 11, 2000, at 58-59 (noting that be-
tween 1977 and 1997, the percentage of Latino women entering college rose by 327% and the
percentage of Latino men entering college rose by 152%; comparable figures for White women
were a 34% increase, for White men an 8% decrease, for African American women an 81% in-
crease, and for African American men a 33% increase).
220. Mendieta, supra note 52, at 45.
221. See Gary Orfield, School Desegregation After Two Generations: Race, Schools, and
Opportunity in Urban Society, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 234, 255
(Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) (“It is hard to understand the implications of
what is happening to the group that is becoming the nation’s largest minority; little serious re-
search has been conducted.”).
222. CREATING THE WILL, supra note 217, at 23; see also Gary Orfield, The Growth of Seg-
regation: African Americans, Latinos, and Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53, 60 (Gary
Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) [hereinafter DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION] (discussing
the concentration of Latinos in high-poverty schools). Professor Gary Orfield of the Harvard
Civil Rights Project has concluded that the rate of Latino segregation varies in different regions
of the United States, but occurs at a lower rate in the Midwest. Id. at 58.
223. Susan E. Eaton, Slipping Toward Segregation: Local Control and Eroding Desegrega-
tion in Montgomery County, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 222, at 207, 217.
224. Id.
225. Orfield, supra note 222, at 53.
226. Id. at 59-60.
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do finish),227 recent school desegregation litigation initiated by African
Americans has not necessarily been helpful to Latinos.228 Professor of
Education and Social Policy Gary Orfield has recognized what most
courts do not: a trial and a resulting remedial order that treat African
Americans and Latinos the same do not sufficiently allow for the
dramatic differences in the contemporary experiences of Latinos and
African Americans. While the characterization of Latinos as Non-
White demonstrates a need for their integration with White students,
such classification results in the tangible harm of increased segrega-
tion of Latinos, and the denial of fundamental differences, such as
English language speaking ability. These results relate directly to the
concentration of Latinos in high-poverty schools, and also likely re-
late to Latinos’ high drop-out rates and thus economic inequality.
Quantifying this harm, the President’s Advisory Commission on Edu-
cational Excellence for Hispanic Americans stated, “[a] social disaster
is in the making. The continued denial of the tools of excellence will
exact a high economic toll on individual Hispanics, the Hispanic
community, and the nation as a whole.”229
When the African American and Latino stories are collapsed,
both are disadvantaged in intangible ways. Each group is denied its
own history and the recognition of its unique present experiences
when the characteristic that becomes most important is that the group
is Non-White—that it has been discriminated against by Whites his-
torically and that it is less privileged than Whites currently. These
generalizations are technically accurate but dangerously overbroad.
Because of their overbreadth, the claims are especially damaging to
Latinos. While the African American civil rights struggle is a well-
known part of our history, the Latino struggle is not. Characterizing
Latinos as merely Non-White for historical purposes can lead to the
assumption that Latinos never suffered invidious discrimination be-
cause, in the United States, Whites did not systematically enslave La-
tinos. Similarly, to conclude that Latinos were not discriminated
against because they were considered legally White by courts in the
1870s230 would be akin to arguing that Latinos are not presently dis-
criminated against because the United States Census also classifies
227. Orfield, supra note 222, at 58; Orfield, supra note 221, at 255-56.
228. Orfield, supra note 221, at 256.
229. White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for Hispanic Ams., supra note 69.
230. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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them as racially White. These interpretations based on the White–
Non-White paradigm threaten Latinos’ pursuit of equality by
assuming the existence of a level playing field where none exists.
C. Recognition of the White Norm
Defining Latinos and African Americans as Non-White has some
benefits. For instance, it brings repeated emphasis to the usually in-
visible standards of whiteness and White privilege. Systemic privilege
results from one group being considered the norm and other groups
being considered deviants from that norm. In the words of Professor
Stephanie Wildman and her co-authors, “privilege is not visible to the
holder of the privilege; privilege appears as part of the normal fabric
of daily life, not as something special.”231 Feminist scholars have ex-
posed male privilege: the fact that women are disadvantaged because
of their sex and are aware of their sex as a potentially negative attrib-
ute, even though women compose half the nation’s population. Simi-
larly, queer theorists have delineated heterosexual privilege: the fact
that heterosexuals do not think about their sexuality, while homo-
sexuals and bisexuals are continually aware of their difference from
the norm and are frequently discriminated against on that basis. In
both of these situations, the privileged group is usually unaware of its
privilege and does not think of itself as being stigmatized because of
how society classifies it. The norm of White privilege functions in a
similar manner.
The hallmark of White privilege is Whites’ ability to go through
their lives without thinking that the way they relate to the world and
the way the world relates to them is influenced by their race.232
Whites’ ability to disregard their race—and thus to think of whiteness
as the normative model—is a product of Whites’ dominance, just as
men’s ability to disregard their sex is a product of male dominance
231. Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege in the Workplace: The Missing Element in Antidis-
crimination Law, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA 25, 27 (Stephanie M. Wildman ed., 1996).
232. Professor Barbara Flagg elaborates on the invisibility of whiteness to Whites: “[I]n this
society, . . . the white person has an everyday option not to think of herself in racial terms at all.
In fact, whites appear to pursue that option so habitually that it may be a defining characteristic
of whiteness: to be white is not to think about it.” Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”:
White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953,
969 (1993); see also Bonnie Kae Grover, Growing Up White in America?, reprinted in CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES, supra note 28, at 34, 34 (“White is transparent. That’s the point of being the
dominant race. Sure, the whiteness is there, but you never think of it. If you’re white, you never
have to think of it.”).
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and heterosexuals’ ability to disregard their sexuality is a product of
heterosexual dominance.233 As Professor Barbara Flagg notes, “[t]he
imposition of transparently white norms is a unique form of uncon-
scious discrimination.”234 Indeed, it is unique precisely because the
standard has been so normalized as to have become unconscious. In
an attempt to make White privilege visible, Peggy McIntosh, the as-
sociate director of the Wellesley College Center for Research on
Women, reports many specific ways in which White privilege func-
tions. The examples she highlights include Whites’ comparative ease
finding housing, ability to shop without being followed because of
race-based suspicions of shoplifting, a general emphasis on historical
contributions of Whites, never being asked to speak for all Whites,
advocating racial equality without risk, and using “flesh” color ban-
dages and cosmetics that are closest in color to White skin.235 Profes-
sor Stephanie Wildman has explored this issue further, specifically
seeking to understand the benefits of American White privilege vis-à-
vis Latinos.236 She gives more examples: others are not surprised when
Whites speak fluent English; they assume Whites were born in the
United States; and they pronounce Whites’ names properly, or, if
there is a question about the pronunciation, will politely make such
an inquiry.237
White privilege is reinforced when racial and ethnic groups are
conceptualized not as White, African American, Latino, Asian
American, Native American, etc., but instead as White or Non-White.
Acknowledgement of differences among groups disappears in a
White–Non-White paradigm, because instead of allowing racial or
ethnic groups to identify themselves by what they are,238 all Non-
233. Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Impli-
cation of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or other –isms), 1991 DUKE L.J.
397, 405 (discussing how majoritarianism made whiteness the normative model).
234. Flagg, supra note 232, at 959.
235. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to
See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND THE
LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 25-27 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
236. Wildman, supra note 58, at 313-14 (basing her list of privileges on the McIntosh model).
237. Id.
238. Admittedly, it is different for White groups to do this, aside from describing White cul-
ture as American popular culture. In Noel Ignatiev’s words, “there is no ‘white’ culture—unless
you mean Wonder bread and television game shows. Whiteness is nothing but an expression of
race privilege.” Treason to Whiteness Is Loyalty to Humanity: An Interview with Noel Ignatiev of
Race Traitor Magazine, THE BLAST!, June-July 1994, reprinted in PEREA, supra note 78, at 490.
While differences exist between White subgroups who trace their heritage to include Eastern
European Jews or those who trace their lineage to the Scotch-Irish (and these individual groups
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White groups are explicitly identified by what they are not, and only
by reference to whiteness. Although aspects of a specific Non-White
group might be easier to identify than “White culture,” this occurs
because White culture is mainstream culture. The culture of a specific
Non-White group appears distinctive because it deviates from the
norm. Professor Martha Mahoney notes that a term such as “racially
identifiable” in the context of housing and urban development gener-
ally refers “to locations that are racially identifiably black.”239 The
same is true in the context of education: racially identifiable means
racially identifiably Non-White.
The White–Non-White paradigm reinforces the power dynamic
of the acted and the acted upon, of presence and absence, of the de-
fining and the defined. The power that Whites receive from their un-
earned privilege in the White–Non-White duality “is, in fact, permis-
sion to escape [the debate of race] or to dominate.”240 When federal
courts reinforce this dynamic in the name of school desegregation,
they perpetuate the normalized, mainstream practices and institutions
that reinforce racial inequality. It is often these practices and institu-
tions that are most damaging in terms of perpetuating oppression be-
cause they are not usually questioned. They are conceptualized as just
normal.241
In contemporary school desegregation jurisprudence, Whites are
normalized, and all Non-Whites are collapsed into the category of
“other.” Like African Americans, Latinos have been the victims of
state-sanctioned educational segregation;242 but if courts gave atten-
tion to the present differences between African Americans and Lati-
nos, courts’ remedial orders would likely be structured differently. As
will be discussed below, the recognition of Latinos and African
Americans as distinct groups that continue to suffer different harms is
easily within reach.
have their own culture) the various White subgroups share the most important feature of having
the social privilege and power of Whiteness.
239. Mahoney, supra note 22, at 1666.
240. McIntosh, supra note 235, at 30.
241. Describing the danger of normalized discrimination, Ignatiev argues, “The color line is
not the work of the relatively small number of hard-core ‘racists’; target not them but the main-
stream institutions that reproduce it.” Noel Ignatiev, How to Be a Race Traitor, reprinted in
PEREA, supra note 78, at 493.
242. See supra notes 116-45 and accompanying text (chronicling the history of Latino school
segregation).
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IV.  THE FUTURE OF LATINOS AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
This Note has argued that race and ethnicity are socially con-
structed concepts in which society instills meaning and that the Latino
identity has been constructed in a self-contradictory manner—at once
White and Non-White—because it does not fit within the Black–
White binary through which Americans understand race. The issue of
Latino identity is further complicated in the context of school
desegregation because federal courts have moved from a Black–
White to a White–Non-White binary. This new paradigm denies the
history of segregation and discrimination against Latinos and fails to
recognize the contemporary differences between Latino and African
American experiences. As a result of this conceptual negligence,
Latinos are denied the full benefits of Brown. The question that must
be asked is what should be done to improve this difficult situation. In
this final part, several alternatives will be proposed to minimize
Latinos’ educational segregation—including options that do not
directly involve the courts.
A. Racial and Ethnic Balancing in the Present System: Considering
Latinos Separately
The most obvious remedy to the present inequality would be to
consider Latinos and African Americans separately for purposes of
establishing racial and ethnic balance in school districts. In school dis-
tricts with substantial African American, Latino, and White student
populations, this approach might be both appropriate and feasible.
Courts could consider this measure sua sponte, or the parties to the
litigation could propose it. Although this measure would rely on some
outmoded standards of racial and ethnic classification, such classifica-
tion would address many of the issues discussed in this Note by mak-
ing Latinos a visible group.
When courts acknowledge the history and contemporary situa-
tion of Latino students, they can craft remedial orders that consider
those students’ unique needs. The Supreme Court has held that every
school in a community is not required to be a mirror image of the spe-
cific racial and ethnic composition in the surrounding community.243
Currently, courts overseeing school desegregation ensure that
schools’ enrollment approximates the White–Non-White balance in
the community, but courts do not distinguish among Non-White
243. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971).
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groups. Courts are not precluded, however, from considering Latino
and African American students’ distinct needs without binding dis-
tricts to strict mandates of multi-group racial and ethnic balance
where such balancing is impractical. Because of Latino students’ con-
centration in large urban areas,244 many smaller school districts will
have such a low percentage of Latino students that to consider them
separately from African Americans for purposes of racial and ethnic
balancing would be a logistical nightmare. In these situations, aware-
ness of and attention to differences between Latinos and African
Americans through means less restrictive than racial balancing would
address present inequalities, especially when narrowly tailored to
specific school systems. It also would promote desegregation of La-
tino students.
A few federal courts have taken the approach of viewing African
Americans and Latinos as distinct groups without mandating racial
balance, though these courts are the exception to the general rule of
the White–Non-White paradigm. The federal district court in Denver
(ironically, the site of origin of the Keyes litigation, which introduced
the White–Non-White paradigm) considered Latinos and African
Americans as distinct groups when issuing the finding of liability in
1970.245 Twenty-five years later, the court utilized these same catego-
ries when applying the six factors identified in Green v. County
School Board246 and declaring that the district had achieved unitary
status.247 Gaps between the hiring rates of Latino and African Ameri-
can faculty and staff, and between Latino and African American stu-
dent dropout rates did not prevent the district from being declared
unitary in light of its attempts to remedy those situations.
The different educational needs of Latino students are clearest in
the context of bilingual education. Bilingual programs often are
threatened during school desegregation litigation248 because of the
244. See CREATING THE WILL, supra note 217, at 23 (noting that in 1998 “the nation’s 10
largest central city school districts collectively enrolled close to 25 percent of all Hispanic stu-
dents, 18 percent of African American students, and only 2 percent of white students”).
245. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 69 (D. Colo. 1970) (noting that “the His-
panos have a wholly different origin, and the problems applicable to them are different”).
246. 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
247. Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1274 (D. Colo. 1995), aff’d,
119 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997). The trial court considered Latinos and African Americans as
distinct groups while discussing faculty and staff hiring processes, 902 F. Supp. at 1296-98, stu-
dent enrollment in the district’s centralized gifted program, id. at 1300, student discipline, id. at
1303, and student dropout rate, id. at 1305.
248. Professor Gary Orfield notes that “[t]he [school desegregation] litigation is often
brought into court by black organizations, with Hispanics becoming participants in a three-sided
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programs’ tendency to group large numbers of Latino students in the
same school. As recently as 1994, the General Accounting Office in-
dicated support for bilingual education programs.249 In 1996, the
President’s Advisory Commission on Educational Excellence for
Hispanic Americans endorsed bilingual education as “[t]he fastest
and most effective way for bilingual students to acquire both a com-
mand of English and a command of classroom subject matter.”250 Al-
though the Clinton administration strongly supported bilingual edu-
cation, bilingual programs have been under attack by ballot initiatives
and likely will not be supported by the George W. Bush administra-
tion, which appears to be focusing on achieving the result of English
fluency rather than focusing on the pedagogical process.251 In just the
past three years, bilingual programs have been “virtually elimi-
nat[ed]”252 by state voter initiatives in California and Arizona253—two
of the six states with the highest concentration of Latinos.254 In Cali-
struggle over the nature of the remedy, often fighting to preserve and expand bilingual educa-
tion within the desegregation plan.” Orfield, supra note 221, at 256.
 249. See White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for Hispanic Ams., supra note 218 (ex-
amining “some of the most serious inadequacies of the educational system for Latino students,
including . . . the lack of sufficient bilingual and English-as-a-Second-Language programs and
teachers”).
250. White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for Hispanic Ams., Factors Affecting His-
panic American Educational Attainment, in Our Nation on the Fault Line: Hispanic American
Education, at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/FaultLine/state2.html#Factors (Sept. 1996) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
251. See George W. Bush, No Child Left Behind, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Jan. 29, 2001)
(presenting the Bush proposal for achieving English fluency for all students), available at
http://www.ed.gov/inits/proposal.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also Don Soifer,
Bush Bilingual Plan Offers Major Changes, SCH. REFORM NEWS, Apr. 2001, at 1, 10 (describing
some of the changes that would occur were the Bush plan implemented). President George W.
Bush held this position during the campaign and at least since 1998. See David Koenig, Gov.
Bush Supports Bilingual Education, SEATTLE TIMES, July 2, 1998, at A8 (describing Bush’s
endorsement of bilingual programs on the condition that such programs teach English to
students); George W. Bush on Immigration, Issues 2000: Every Presidential Candidate’s View
on Every Issue, at http://www.issues2000.org/George_W__Bush_Immigration.htm (last visited
Apr. 15, 2001) (citing Bush’s proposal to “[r]espect other languages, but teach all children
English”) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
252. Lynn Schnaiberg, Immigrants: Providing a Lesson in How to Adapt, EDUC. WK., Jan.
27, 1999, at 34, 35.
253. Both the California and Arizona ballot initiatives were spearheaded by California Re-
publican (and unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate) Ron Unz. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 122,
127 (detailing Unz’s efforts in California and Arizona). In 2000, Arizona voters approved a
measure that will replace bilingual education with “structured immersion” beginning in August
2001. The form of “structured immersion” has not yet been defined. Bilingual Legal Muddle
Has Schools Under Fire: Federal Intimidation, Lack of Local Leadership, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan.
23, 2001, at B6.
254. The six states with the greatest number of Latinos are, in descending order, California
(10,459,616), Texas (6,045,430), New York (2,660,685), Florida (2,334,403), Illinois (1,276,193),
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fornia, this proposition passed “despite the vehement opposition of 63
percent of Latino voters.”255 Additionally, the New York City public
schools have recently approved a proposal that will allow parents to
choose from among four language education programs.256 The need to
balance schools racially and ethnically would not threaten bilingual
programs if courts took a more pragmatic approach and considered
Latinos’ specific educational needs. Because of the successful ballot
initiatives in California and Arizona, and the reduction of bilingual
education in New York City, bilingual education might be eliminated
long before such programs ever would be contemplated by courts.257
Uniform racial balance might need to be sacrificed to preserve
bilingual programs, but given Latinos’ social and economic disadvan-
tages as a group, that sacrifice seems wholly appropriate and could be
accomplished easily through a pragmatic approach. In his oversight of
the Keyes litigation, Federal District Judge Richard Matsch specifi-
cally considered the role of bilingual education programs in the Den-
ver desegregation remedial order from 1974 through 1985.258 He
“brought the language issues into the mainstream of the desegrega-
tion litigation” by “not order[ing] a discrete remedy for the language
issues but link[ing] their resolution to the creation of a unitary school
system.”259 Importantly, the inclusion of bilingual education in the re-
and Arizona (1,084,250). U.S. Census Bureau, Population Projections Program, Population Di-
vision, States Ranked by Hispanic Population, at http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/
state/rank/hisp.txt (July 1, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). These population esti-
mates were released in July 1999. Id.
255. DAVIS, supra note 5, at 122.
256. Lynette Holloway, Board of Education Votes, 7-0, to Revamp Bilingual Programs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A1. The four programs from among which parents can choose include:
(1) traditional bilingual education where core subjects are taught in the student’s native lan-
guage and other subjects are taught in English; (2) English as a Second Language (ESL) in
which core subjects are taught in English; (3) a new after-school and weekend program for Eng-
lish language instruction; and (4) a dual language program. Id.
257. President George W. Bush has taken the easy way out by not endorsing either bilingual
education or language immersion. Bush has attempted to endorse whatever works (without
knowing what that is). See supra note 251 and accompanying text. However, the effectiveness of
bilingual education versus immersion is the subject of extensive pedagogical debate. See, e.g.,
White House Initiative on Educ. Excellence for Hispanic Ams., supra note 218 (advocating the
implementation of bilingual educational programs as the best way to ensure teaching of the
English language and of academic subject matter). For an overview of immersion programs, see
ERIC Digest, Foreign Language Immersion Programs, at http://www.cal.org/ericcll/digest/
met00001.html (Nov. 1993) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
258. James J. Fishman & Lawrence Strauss, Endless Journey: Integration and the Provision
of Equal Educational Opportunity in Denver’s Public Schools: A Study of Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 1, in JUSTICE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATION
LITIGATION 185, 208 (Barbara Flicker ed., 1990).
259. Id.
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medial order did not alter the remedial plan so much as to require the
reassignment or dislocation of White students.260 Keyes demonstrates
that a strong bilingual education program can coexist with a success-
ful desegregation order. As shown in Denver, federal courts have the
ability to recognize the differences between Latino and African
American students and to respond accordingly. The more radical
question, though, is whether the courts are the correct forum in which
to pursue racial equality.
B. To Be or Not to Be (in Court)?
The Keyes case was filed in 1968. Federal court supervision
ended when a district judge declared the district unitary in 1995, and
the end of court supervision was confirmed in 1997 when the Tenth
Circuit approved the declaration of unitary status. The Denver school
district’s thirty-year supervision period is not uncommon, and Judge
Matsch’s closing comments in his final order in Keyes bear considera-
tion:
This case has not been unique. It is but one of many such cases
across the country. What is most common in the history of all those
cases is uncertainty. Thousands of pages have been written by scores
of federal judges attempting to articulate guiding principles under
the broad constitutional concept announced in Brown v. Board of
Education. What has been demonstrated most clearly is that courts
using the adversary system were not designed to accomplish institu-
tional reform. The Supreme Court has recognized in its most recent
relevant opinions that the framers of the Constitution put their faith
in the people and the democratic process to determine and provide
for the general welfare.261
In many ways, it is nearly fifty years too late to ask the question of
whether federal courts are the appropriate body to oversee each de-
tail in the process of implementing Brown. Both liberals and conser-
vatives question this judicial role, though for profoundly different
reasons.262 If opposing political groups came together to support cur-
tailing—or even ending—judicial intervention in school desegregation
260. See id. at 220 (contrasting the burdens of this remedy with those of busing).
261. Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1307 (D. Colo. 1995) (citation
omitted).
262. Neal Devins, The Judicial Role in Equality Decisionmaking, in REDEFINING
EQUALITY, supra note 170, at 218, 227 (noting that “some progressives and many conservatives
oppose judicial intervention,” although for different reasons).
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oversight, it certainly would not be the first time that politics made
strange bedfellows in the area of educational policy.263 Working out-
side a judicial framework to resolve school segregation would not re-
quire courts to change the Supreme Court’s White–Non-White para-
digm but could allow instead for the easier creation of a new
paradigm in a context where no previous frameworks exist.
School desegregation measures were implemented in communi-
ties across the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the
absence of litigation or involvement by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. Desegregation efforts in Colorado Springs,
Colorado, in Stamford, Connecticut, and in Berkeley, California, all
relied on strong community involvement in formulating plans for de-
segregation.264 Although the leadership of school district superinten-
dents and school boards was important in initiating desegregation ef-
forts, citizens’ advisory committees and open forums kept community
members aware of the school boards’ evolving plans.265 These “success
stories” reinforce Professor Gerry Spann’s argument that the political
process, rather than federal courtrooms, is the most effective forum in
which to pursue equality.266 However, these examples should not be
taken to mean that “courts will not play even a limited role in ‘per-
mitting change.’”267 As many argue, litigation “must be linked to a
broader-based political and social movement,”268 as illustrated by the
first school desegregation order in Lemon Grove, California.
263. Consider, for example, the current school voucher movement that is supported by lib-
erals who believe public schools are failing the most disadvantaged children (often working class
African American and Latino children), and conservatives who believe that parents should not
be forced to support financially a school system from which they derive no direct benefit.
264. CONN. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT 14 (July 1977); STAFF REPORT OF THE U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 4, 9 (Aug.
1977); STAFF REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO 3, 6, 11 (Feb. 1977).
265. CONN. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT 14 (July 1977); STAFF REPORT OF THE U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 4, 9 (Aug.
1977); STAFF REPORT OF THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN
COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO 3, 6, 11 (Feb. 1977).
266. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND
MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 4-5 (1993).
267. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown
Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 670 (1995).
268. Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Community
in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 55 (1995); see also Culp, supra note 267, at 670
(making the same argument about the dangers of overreliance on litigation).
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Liberals who note “the despair and suffering of poor black, Na-
tive American, Latino(a) and Chicano(a) children” express skepti-
cism of the “paradigm that asks us to place our hopes for radical so-
cial transformation in the courts of this land.”269 And this skepticism is
well-earned. Aside from the question of whether desegregating
schools is an appropriate task for federal courts, critics of desegrega-
tion often cite cases like the court-supervised desegregation of Bos-
ton’s public schools where decades of federal intervention resulted in
higher segregation and lower test scores.270 Another situation that has
generated high costs (quite literally) is the Kansas City case, Missouri
v. Jenkins.271 Jenkins has resulted in dramatic “White flight” in the
Kansas City school district. The district court reacted to this demo-
graphic change by approving enormous financial expenditures to cre-
ate magnet schools,272 but those new schools ultimately have been in-
effective at luring White students back into Kansas City’s public
schools.273
One alternative to traditional judicial oversight is to enlist a small
group of educational professionals to implement the court-ordered
remedy. The group’s work would be loosely overseen by the courts.
These education specialists would not be imbued with nearly the
whole of the court’s authority, as are the court-appointed “masters”
who oversee school districts throughout the country.274 Additionally,
269. Hazel Carby, Can the Tactics of Cultural Integration Counter the Persistence of Political
Apartheid? Or, the Multicultural Wars, Part Two, in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS
ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 221, 226 (Austin Sarat ed., 1996) [hereinafter RACE, LAW
AND CULTURE].
270. Jeremy Rabkin, Racial Divisions and Judicial Obstructions, in REDEFINING EQUALITY,
supra note 170, at 82, 92.
271. 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
272. In 1995, the total cost of capital improvements ordered by the district court to remedy
de jure segregation in Kansas City’s public schools exceeded $540 million. Id. at 78. The funds
were used for:
high schools in which every classroom will have air conditioning, an alarm system,
and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot planetarium; green houses and vivari-
ums; a 25-acre farm with an air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model
United Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio and television
studios with an editing and animation lab; a temperature controlled art gallery; movie
editing and screening rooms; a 3,500-square-foot dust-free diesel mechanics room;
1,875-square-foot elementary school animal rooms for use in a zoo project; swimming
pools; and numerous other facilities.
Id. at 79.
273. Id.
274. See generally David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed
Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REV. 313 (1981) (discussing
the role of masters in school desegregation generally and analyzing masters’ performance in six
northern school districts specifically). For a criticism of courts’ deference to masters, see Donald
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this group would work with the litigants and act more as mediators
than as judges. In the early stages of school desegregation litigation,
parties should explore extra-legal means of alternative dispute resolu-
tion as an avenue for creating an initial remedial agreement without
filing a claim in court. Federal courts will retain ultimate authority,
however, because they wield the force of law.
While judicial intervention certainly has not been comfortable or
without cost, the deluge of desegregation litigation during the last
fifty years has unquestionably reinforced the idea that the govern-
ment cannot intentionally discriminate against individuals on the ba-
sis of their race or ethnicity. Given the high standards of “intent”
which the courts require to determine that a school district is liable
for segregating its students,275 and the much more subtle and normal-
ized ways in which racism pervades our society as demonstrated by
the concept of White privilege,276 another wave of school desegrega-
tion litigation is unlikely. In light of the past forty-five years of school
desegregation litigation and federal judicial oversight, a school district
that is alleged to have segregated its students on the basis of race or
ethnicity would be well advised to take fast and dramatic steps to re-
inforce racial and ethnic equality within its system and settle any
claims long before they proceed to trial. The costs of discovery and
litigation are financially damaging, and litigation is detrimental to the
morale of the school district and the community.
The complicated history of school desegregation efforts suggests
that the most effective solution for Latinos’ present inequality does
not include exclusive reliance on the courts. To achieve the goal of
L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983
DUKE L.J. 1265, 1297-1302.
275. Though the standards are high, they are not uniform, with various circuits giving differ-
ent weight to objective and subjective elements of intent. The Second Circuit balances subjec-
tive and objective elements of intent by “holding that foreseeable consequences, while not spe-
cifically identifiable with intention, can provide evidence for its presence.” Arthur v. Nyquist,
573 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1978). The Fifth Circuit aligns itself with the Second Circuit, though
the Fifth Circuit professes to have adopted a purely objective test. United States v. Tex. Educ.
Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit permits a finding of segregatory
intent to be “inferred from acts and policies of school authorities which had the natural and
foreseeable effect of producing segregated schools.” NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d
1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1977). In the same breath, however, the Sixth Circuit takes care to distin-
guish itself from the “‘discriminatory effect’ test repudiated in Washington v. Davis and Austin
Independent School District v. United States.” Id. (citations omitted). At the other extreme, the
Ninth Circuit requires a “determination that the school authorities had intentionally discrimi-
nated against minority students by practicing a deliberate policy of racial segregation.” Soria v.
Oxnard Sch. Dist., 488 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir. 1973).
276. For a description of White privilege, see supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
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equal educational opportunity for all students, including Latinos, the
responsibility for ensuring racial and ethnic equality must not end
with a judge. The goal of desegregation litigation continues to be to
“increase the ability of public schools to break the link between the
social, political, and economic circumstances of one generation and
the next.”277 The more responsibility local communities and school
boards take for ensuring Latinos equal educational opportunity, the
less the federal courts will need to flex their collective muscle.
C. Secondary School and Legal Education
My final suggestions involve ways to begin reconstructing race
and ethnicity to include the Latino narrative. These measures go to
the root of the problem of Latino school segregation. As explained
above, Latinos suffer from higher rates of school segregation because
they are not considered distinct from African Americans and are ren-
dered invisible in a White–Non-White paradigm by a society that
never learns about Latinos’ unique history and present experiences.278
The reason that the socially constructed nature of race and ethnicity
is important is that, because they are constructed to begin with, these
concepts theoretically can be reconstructed. The process of recon-
struction entails changing the norm—the way society thinks about a
concept—a task fraught with difficulty.279 Thus, the following sugges-
tions are limited to concrete ways the education system can be used to
dismantle the White–Non-White paradigm by integrating the Latino
narrative into the teaching of American history and law.
Some scholars argue that continuing to focus on race and ethnic-
ity merely perpetuates racism by endorsing a race- and ethnicity-
277. Denise C. Morgan, The Less Polite Questions: Race, Place, Poverty and Public Educa-
tion, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 267, 276 (1998).
278. See infra notes 288-96 and accompanying text.
279. Professors Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic describe a reconstructive paradox as
consisting of six parts, which can be thought of sequentially: first, the greater a social evil, the
more likely it is to be entrenched; second, the more entrenched the evil, the greater the social
effort required to dislodge that evil; third, the harm of the evil is invisible to many because the
harm is normalized; fourth, a social effort inevitably conflicts with normalized social values and
would significantly shift the way we interact with each other; fifth, those shifts in our interac-
tions are highly visible because they clearly oppose the norm and thus cause massive backlash;
and sixth, supporting the backlash seems appropriate because the radical social instigators are
sacrificing commonly held values for some nebulous goal. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive
Paradox, in REDEFINING EQUALITY, supra note 170, at 154, 160.
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focused worldview.280 Rather than a “colorblind” view of race, I en-
dorse a “multicultural” view of race and ethnicity.281 Racism will not
cease to exist merely because we ignore it. Rather, it will cease to ex-
ist when we recognize, understand, and dismantle the system of White
privilege that supports it. A crucial step in this change is understand-
ing the ways White privilege is reinforced by the White–Non-White
dichotomy that defines all groups in relation to the White norm.282
The history and contemporary experience of Latinos is increas-
ingly taught in secondary schools. A standard high school American
history book includes a discussion of the Mexican–American War,283
Latinos’ participation in World War II,284 and the Latino civil rights
movement.285 This text was reviewed by nine historians, one of whom
specializes in Latino history.286 A standard American history book
used in Advanced Placement courses also acknowledges the involve-
ment of Latinos in American history.287 The inclusion of Latino his-
tory in these textbooks is a great step towards breaking down the
280. Richard Payne’s argument illustrates this point: “The habitual use of terms like ‘race’
and ‘racism’ almost guarantees a racial worldview or perspective will be perpetuated. The
stereotypes that are integral components of a racial perspective are often subconsciously ac-
cepted not only by those who gain but also by those who are disadvantaged by their existence.”
PAYNE, supra note 25, at 11. Jeremy Rabkin’s comment falls along a similar trajectory: “The
more explicit the race-conscious element in law, the more it teaches whites that blacks cannot
compete on their own and the more it teaches blacks that whites are too irredeemably racist to
afford fair treatment to all races without coercion.” Rabkin, supra note 270, at 85.
281. Gary Peller defines multiculturalism as
the notion that American society should be understood as a collection of diverse cul-
tural groups rather than as a single, unified national body on one hand or as simply an
aggregate of atomized individuals on the other. . . . [A] multiculturalist sensibility im-
plies that the government must recognize and respect if not nurture the diversity and
integrity of racial and ethnic communities.
Gary Peller, Cultural Imperialism, White Anxiety, and the Ideological Realignment of Brown, in
RACE, LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 269, at 190, 193. He continues,
The contemporary emergence of multiculturalism is ultimately traceable to various
historical factors, and it is only partial; nevertheless, it also seems clear that one of its
main, established tenets has been the idea of acknowledging and respecting differ-
ence, rather than assuming, like the Brown consciousness seemed to, that there was a
neutral, acultural institutional reality, in public schools or any other places, that
would transcend race.
Id. at 209.
282. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
283. ANDREW CAYTON ET AL., AMERICA: PATHWAYS TO THE PRESENT 276-80 (1998).
284. Id. at 706-11.
285. Id. at 831-33.
286. Id. at vi.
287. See PAUL S. BOYER ET AL., THE ENDURING VISION: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 361-73 (2000) (chronicling the American settlement of Texas and the development of
the Mexican–American War); id. at 740-44 (analyzing Latinos’ economic condition during the
Great Depression); id. at 835-36 (discussing the Latino civil rights struggle).
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Black–White binary and the White–Non-White paradigm, and recog-
nizing differences among racial and ethnic groups in the United
States.
This recognition of the Latino narrative is often overlooked in
legal education, especially in the area of constitutional law—a re-
quired first-year course in law schools across the United States. Of six
leading constitutional law casebooks, four overlook the topic of Lati-
nos in connection with school desegregation. Because of the unique
questions presented in Keyes v. Denver, it would be easiest for case-
books to include the discussion of Latinos in their discussion of Keyes,
especially since most of the texts that omit a discussion of Latinos in
school desegregation already cite Keyes for other purposes. The three
texts edited by Professor William Lockhart,288 Professor Geoffrey
Stone,289 and Professors Gerald Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan,290 all
cite Keyes in a condensed or excerpted form and focus on the devel-
opment of the standard of discriminatory intent. The text edited by
Professor Donald Lively includes a brief textual discussion of Keyes,
but, again, for other purposes.291 These four texts devote a total of 475
pages to discussions of race and ethnicity and equal protection in-
cluding a total of 128 pages devoted to school desegregation cases and
commentary.292
Two other constitutional law textbooks address the racial and
ethnic aspect of Keyes, and thus the involvement of Latinos in school
desegregation litigation. Professors William Cohen and Jonathan D.
288. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1206 (8th ed. 1996).
289. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 533-35 (3d ed. 1996). The only
indexed discussion of Latinos in this 1814 page book was in reference to Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), a case permitting the use of peremptory challenges to strike Latino
jurors because of the Court’s concern that Spanish-speaking jurors would reject the Court’s
English translations of Spanish-speaking witnesses’ testimony in favor of the actual, untrans-
lated testimony of such witnesses. See STONE, supra, at 630-31.
290. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776-77 (13th
ed. 1997).
291. DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, HISTORY, AND
DIALOGUES 706 (2d ed. 2000). In a separate section, the Lively text parenthetically mentions
Latinos’ benefits from affirmative action as part of a discussion of the benefits African Ameri-
cans have received from affirmative action. Id. at 810-11.
292. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 290, at 662-81 (discussing race discrimination
and equal protection); id. at 673-77, 680-81 (discussing school desegregation); LIVELY ET AL.,
supra note 291, at 647-825 (discussing racial equality); id. at 685, 690-719, 721-27 (discussing
school desegregation); LOCKHART ET AL., supra note 288, at 1163-1270 (discussing race and
ethnic ancestry); id. at 1171-79, 1200-19, 1220-22, 1223-26, 1244-45 (discussing school desegrega-
tion); STONE ET AL., supra note 289, at 495-567, 595-697 (discussing racial equality and equal
protection); id. at 518-61 (discussing school desegregation).
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Varat’s text amply discusses this aspect of Keyes,293 and Professor
Ronald Rotunda’s textbook includes a brief excerpt from this aspect
of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Keyes.294 These two texts dedicate a
total of 118 pages to cases and commentary about race and ethnicity
and equal protection, including a total of sixty-seven pages to school
segregation. Additionally, the leading education law casebook edited
by University of Minnesota President Mark Yudof and Professors
David Kirp and Betsy Levin addresses the unique racial and ethnic
issues present in Keyes and the position of Latino students in school
desegregation.295 The Yudof text provides a substantial excerpt from
the Supreme Court’s decision as well as additional commentary.296
Not surprisingly, this text allocated 119 pages to issues of race and
ethnicity and equal protection, including 91 pages discussing school
segregation.297
If lawyers are not taught about the history of Latino educational
segregation, it is not surprising that even those who work as advocates
for social justice might not appreciate the importance of distinguish-
ing between Latinos and African Americans—and avoiding consti-
tuting them as one Non-White group. Changes to these law school
texts would be only a first step. Professors must also teach Keyes not
only as a case that changed the standard of segregative intent and
brought desegregation to the North, but also as a decision instituting
the White–Non-White paradigm.
Schools are the site of the iteration of knowledge. Value-based
judgments are implicit in what is deemed worthy to be taught. Those
judgments are communicated, perhaps unconsciously and almost cer-
tainly unintentionally, through textbooks and classroom discussions.
Therefore, changing the content of what is taught not only changes
the base of knowledge, but also alters widely held social assumptions
293. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 721-22 (William Cohen and Jonathan
D. Varat eds., 10th ed. 1997); id. at 592-743 (discussing suspect classifications and racial minori-
ties); id. at 706-743 (discussing school desegregation); id. at 702 (discussing Hernandez).
294. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES 641 (6th
ed. 2000); id. at 619-84 (discussing racial equality); id. at 626-84 (discussing school desegrega-
tion); id. at 641 (mentioning Latinos).
295. MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 533-35 (3d ed. 1992).
296. The forthcoming edition of this text, MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY
AND THE LAW (4th ed. forthcoming 2001) retains this discussion. See E-mail from Betsy Levin,
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, to Kristi L.
Bowman (Jan. 29, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
297. YUDOF ET AL., supra note 295, at 469-587 (discussing equal opportunity and race); id.
at 469-559 (discussing school desegregation).
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that serve to reinforce the exclusion of Latinos and render them in-
visible.
CONCLUSION
This Note has drawn together many concepts to argue that the
current situation, in which Latinos are made invisible in the White–
Non-White paradigm of school desegregation, is not just. Nor is it
inevitable. The Latino identity has been constructed by many forces,
including various branches of the federal government, in confusing
and often conflicting ways. The unique identity of Latinos is
important because of Latinos’ common experience in the United
States, an experience distinct from African Americans’ and with
which it should not be conflated. School desegregation, however, has
collapsed the Latino narrative, first rendering it homeless in the
Black–White binary that was the legacy of Brown, and then rendering
it invisible in the White–Non-White paradigm that was the legacy of
Keyes. Recognizing Latinos as a distinct group is inconsistent with
both the Black–White and the White–Non-White paradigm, and thus
it would threaten the privilege connected to those binaries. Latinos
are a significant percentage of our nation’s population, though, and
are becoming a greater percentage every day. Maintaining paradigms
that allow for the greater educational segregation of Latinos is
inconsistent with the spirit—if not the letter—of Brown.
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APPENDIX
In 1930, the school board in Lemon Grove, California, built a
barn-like structure that was intended to serve as a separate school for
the district’s Latino students. Previously, the Latino children had at-
tended the same school as all the other students in the small district.
The Latino parents protested this de jure segregation, ultimately su-
ing the Lemon Grove school board in the San Diego County courts.
Breaking with the traditions of its time, the court held in 1931 that the
Latino students could not be segregated from the White students and
that the school district should return to the previous integrated school
system. This case, Alvarez v. Owen, is the first known successful
school desegregation case. Brown v. Board of Education was decided
fifteen years later. The judgment in this case and the peremptory writ
of mandate (the remedial order) exist only on aging microfilm in San
Diego County. For the historical record, they are reprinted here. The
case was not appealed and was never recorded in the official minutes
of Lemon Grove school board meetings.
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